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WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL WORLDS
COLLIDE: RESURRECTING THE
FRAMERS' BILL OF-RIGHTS AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
George

C.

Thomas III*

INTRODUCTION

Different Constitutional Worlds

For two hundred years, the Supreme Court has been interpreting
the Bill of Rights. Imagine Chief Justice John Marshall sitting in the
dim, narrow Supreme Court chambers,1 pondering the interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process in United States
v. Burr.2 Aaron Burr was charged with treason for planning to invade
the Louisiana Territory and create a separate government there.3 To
help prepare his defense, Burr wanted to see a letter written by
General James Wilkinson to President Jefferson. In ruling on Burr's
motion to compel disclosure, Marshall departed from the literal lan
guage of the Sixth Amendment - which guarantees only the right to
compel the attendance of witnesses4 - to hold that Burr was entitled
to compel production of the letter. The distinction between compel* Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers,
Newark. B.S. 1968, University of Tennessee; M.F.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, University of Iowa;
LL.M. 1982, J.S.D. 1986, Washington University in St. Louis. - Ed. Many people provided
helpful ideas and feedback - too many to name here. I should, however, acknowledge a few
special debts. In various conversations, Donald Dripps put the idea squarely in my mind that
incorporation was "the wrong road taken" in the criminal context and that it might not be
too late to reverse course. Sherry Colb and Barbara Spillman Schweiger read earlier drafts
and offered many detailed critiques and suggestions, as well as enthusiastic support. Michael
Mulligan offered superior research assistance and more. He contributed ideas, phrasing, and
an ongoing dialogue that sharpened every aspect of the Article. Dean Stuart Deutsch gener
ously provided a research stipend to support this project. Finally, the editors at the Michigan
Law Review engaged my ideas in ways that improved the substance and presentation of the
Article. Though the end product is better because of help from these friends and others, I
alone am responsible for the defects that remain.
1 . By leave of Congress, the Court in those days met in a small room, twenty-four feet
wide and thirty feet long, located on the first floor of the Capitol. LEONARD BAKER, JOHN
MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 355-56 (1974).
2. 25 F. Cas. 30 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D) (Marshall, CJ., sitting as district court
judge).
3. For more on the context and eventual resolution of Burr, see Peter Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ling witnesses to attend and compelling witnesses to bring papers with
them, Marshall wrote, "is too much attenuated to be countenanced in
the tribunals of a just and humane nation."5 Marshall's view is widely
regarded as a "sweeping construction to the compulsory process
clause."6
Fast forward just over 180 years and imagine Justice John Paul
Stevens sitting at his desk pondering the interpretation of the right to
compulsory process in Taylor v. Illinois.7 Taylor subpoenaed two wit
nesses who would testify to his innocence of the charge of attempted
murder, but his lawyer failed to include their names on the list of de
fense witnesses that Illinois law required him to turn over to the
prosecutor. From a list of sanctions for the lawyer's failure, the state
trial judge chose the most draconian - he forbade the witnesses from
testifying. The Court held in an opinion by Stevens that the right to
compulsory process, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not forbid the judge from barrillg the testimony of
witnesses that might have moved the jury to vote not guilty.
In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the right to compulsory
process broadly to protect the rights of someone charged with treason
against our young republic. In 1988, Justice Stevens, one of the
Rehnquist Court liberals, interpreted the right to compulsory process
narrowly in a garden variety state felony case. What happened along
the road between these two decisions?
One crucial cause of the change in the Court's interpretive theory
is the doctrine of "incorporation." For almost all of our history, the
federal government and each of the States operated independently in
defining, investigating, and prosecuting crime. The Bill of Rights' limi
tations on government did not apply to the States,8 which were free to
protect - or not protect - individual liberties as they saw fit. Though
all the criminal systems in this country drew from the colonial com
mon law, the federal criminal process was doctrinally a world unto it
self. It was separate from the worlds of the state processes.
Then came the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868 in re
sponse to the refusal of the Southern States to protect the rights of
former slaves and Union loyalists. The Fourteenth Amendment gave
the Court, for the first time, a constitutional device for reviewing state
law. Its broad, vague language permitted the Court to insist that, at
least in some limited circumstances,9 the States must honor fundamen5. 25 F. Cas. at 35.
6. Westen, supra note 3, at 101.
7. 484 U.S. 400 (1 988).
8. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that due process forbids a
state conviction based on a confession coerced by physical brutality); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that due process requires appointment of counsel in a state capital
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tal rights. The States could no longer abridge the privileges and im
munities of citizens, or deny any person due process or equal protec
tion of the laws. But no one in the Congress or in the ratifying state
legislatures attempted to present a comprehensive account of privi
leges and immunities, due process, or equal protection.10
For decades, the Court sought to articulate a Fourteenth Amend
ment theory of fundamental rights. Benjamin Cardozo, one of the
Court's leading thinkers, defined Fourteenth Amendment protections
to include the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions."11 Felix
Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan II continued the effort.12 Ulti
mately, however, the Court abandoned the attempt to build from
scratch a comprehensive theory of the rights protected by the Four
teenth Amendment13 and, instead, turned to the Bill of Rights for a
model. By its own hand, the Court forced the world of the Fourteenth
Amendment to collide with that of the Bill of Rights. Incorporation
resulted.
The Court began the incorporation journey with the First
Amendment, but it has now incorporated almost the entirety of the

case where the defendants were ignorant and indigent, and the trial was conducted in a
frenzy of racial hatred).
10. Senator Jacob Howard stated that the Fourteenth Amendment.privileges or immu
nities included all the rights guaranteed in the first eight Bill of Rights amendments plus cer
tain natural law rights. Howard offered examples of the latter but no definitive account.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
1 1 . Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (Cardozo, J., writing for eight mem
bers of the Court) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
12. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting that due process includes "immutable principles . . . of free government which no
member of the Union may disregard") (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898));
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., writing for the Court) (due process
is the "compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because
they are basic to our free society" and which "may not too rhetorically be called eternal veri
ties").
13. The reasons the Court gave up this effort are surely many and complex, and far be
yond the scope of this Article. One cause worth noting is our heritage of having a written
Constitution. Our federal government began with a written Constitution, and American
judges have always been more reluctant than British judges to "uncover" natural law. In
Bram v . United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), for example, the Supreme Court engaged in an
exhaustive review of the cases dealing with involuntary confessions. Almost all of these cases
were state and English cases based on c:ommon law, derived from the unwritten English
"constitution" that has its origin in Lockean notions of natural law. When it came time to
decide the case before it, however, the Bram Court was careful to note that it was interpret
ing the Fifth Amendment prohibition of compelling persons to be witnesses against them
selves. The Court found that this Fifth Amendment provision included the common law
prohibition against the use of involuntary confessions: "the generic language of the [Fifth]
Amendment was but a crystallization of the doctrine as to confessions, well settled [in the
common law] when the Amendment was adopted, and since expressed in the text writers
and expounded by the adjudications . . . ." Id. at 543.

148

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 100:145

Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Most of these rights
limit the power of government to investigate and prosecute crime. In
corporation thus caused the world of federal criminal process to col
lide with the fifty different worlds of state criminal processes. In in
corporating the criminal procedure guarantees,15 the Court sought to
provide the benefits of the broad federal protections to state criminal
defendants. But the Court has never had the appetite to apply the
provisions to the States as rigorously as it had applied them against the
federal government.
Scholars agree that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have limited
the scope of criminal procedure guarantees.16 What remains largely
hidden is the role of incorporation in the steadily diminishing scope of
the criminal procedure guarantees. And this shrinking scope is not the
only problem. The Court also has demonstrated a willingness to bend
precedents to accomplish its goal of facilitating more effective state
policing. As Donald Dripps puts it, "In the criminal procedure con
text, the Court rather openly decides cases with minimal respect for
doctrinal constraints. . . . [which] has generated an unprincipled and
inconsistent body of law" filled with "arbitrary distinctions."17 No sat
isfactory understanding of the constitutional implications of incorpora
tion exists because almost everyone looks at the phenomenon "post
collision," ignoring or trivializing what those very different worlds
looked like before the collision.18 The key to understanding incorporal4. The exceptions are rights that might be considered exotic (the Second Amendment
right to bear arms; the Third Amendment ban on quartering troops in private homes) or ir
relevant to ascertaining criminal guilt (bail and grand jury indictment); the Seventh
Amendment right to a civil jury; the Ninth Amendment reservation of rights to the people.
15. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (right against double jeopardy);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1 967) (right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses subpoenaed· by defen
dants); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses who testify for the
prosecution); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against compelled self incrimina
tion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for indigent defendants
charged with felonies); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (right against cruel and
unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right to exclude evidence found
in violation of the Fourth Amendment); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public
trial).
16. See, e.g., Craig Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth Amend
ment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993); Tracey Maclin, The Decline
of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1258 (1990); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the
Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69 (1989); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The In
credible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
17. Donald Dripps, Akhi/ Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I
Go Down That Wrong Road Again '', 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1559-61 (1996).
18. Two notable exceptions are Akhil Reed Amar and Donald Dripps. See AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998); Dripps, supra note 17. As will be clear in the
balance of this Article, I think Amar gets the history mostly wrong and often draws unjusti
fied inferences. I mostly agree with Dripps but offer a more comprehensive historical ac
count.
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tion is to look at the two doctrines before they collided. Only then do
we have a proper background and framework against which to exam
ine the world in which we find ourselves.
Return to the 1790s. The States eye the central government, to
which they have just ceded much of their sovereignty, as a potential
bully or, worse, as a tyrant. The States look upon the freshly minted
central government as it looms above them, and it reminds them of
King George III and Parliament. Evidence of this strong antigovern
ment attitude can be seen in the intense reaction of some of the States
to the Alien and Sedition Laws, enacted in 1798. Thomas Jefferson
predicted a quasi monarchy if those laws were accepted by the citi
zenry: "(W]e shall immediately see attempted another act of Congress,
declaring that the President shall continue in office during life, re
serving to another occasion the transfer of the succession to his heirs,
and the establishment of the Senate for life!"19
Eight years earlier, in 1790, many feared precisely that abuse of
power. The government was· but three years old, and no one knew
how it might exercise its powers. Because of this fear of the distant,
unknown government, the Bill of Rights is added in 1791, and the
States grow more comfortable. They view the Bill of Rights as a wall
between themselves and the central government. It guarantees free
expression, forbids a national religion, guarantees a criminal process
that is difficult to manipulate, and, in the Ninth and Tenth Amend
ments, specifically reserves rights and powers to the people and the
States.
The potential tyrant has been hobbled. The citizens of the States
are free to criticize the central government, to petition it, and to close
their doors against its agents. Moreover, the prosecutors and judges of
the central government can reach the citizens of States only through a
rigorous process that includes the right to honexcessive bail, to trial by
juries drawn from the community, to assistance of counsel, and to con
front accusers who might not be telling the truth. The Supreme Court
comprehends that the Bill of Rights was meant to limit severely the
powers of the central government, erecting a formidable wall between
the citizens and the government. The Court interprets these provisions
to require federal prosecutors to walk through a narrow gate in the
wall. The gate is hedged with a series of requirements designed to
make convictions more difficult to obtain. In the meantime, the States
remain sovereign, free to conduct their affairs in most criminal matters
as if the federal government did not exist.
Time passes. The debate over slavery and state sovereignty erupts
into the Civil War, wrecking the country's peace and prosperity. Most
Americans come to realize that too much state sovereignty is as haz19. THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, at xiii (J.W. Randolph ed., 1850).
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ardous as too little. Many begin to view the States, which they once
thought of as responsive and protective of rights, with suspicion, par
ticularly in their treatment of the freed slaves. The Fourteenth
Amendment arrives with its explicit, though vague, limitations on state
power. It takes the Court many years, but eventually it turns to the
Bill of Rights to understand what rights the Fourteenth Amendment
should protect from state intrusion.
Now the Bill of Rights applies to the States, through the funda
mental rights lens that is the Fourteenth Amendment, and the States
struggle under this projection. Litigation explodes and the fundamen
tal rights versions of the Bill of Rights evolve through thousands of in
terpretations. We have been living with incorporation so long that any
other system seems unthinkable. Of course the States should have to
provide the same right to counsel or the same freedom of speech as
the federal government, shouldn't they?
But there is one flaw in the process. Once the worlds collide, once
the Bill of Rights guarantees are incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, only one doctrine evolves - the doctrine expressing the
fundamental rights· that the Court "found" in the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Though the resulting unitary version of First Amendment rights
seems to have worked well enough, an odd phenomenon has arisen in
the interpretation of the criminal procedure guarantees. When the
Court imposed the criminal procedure protections on the States in the
1960s,20 the relevant concern was no longer the fear of a powerful cen
tral government but, rather, a concern with the accuracy or fairness of
the state processes leading to a verdict. As long as the process seemed
likely to produce accurate verdicts and met a minimal threshold of
fairness, the Court had little interest in making it more difficult for
States to obtain convictions of dangerous criminals. When the Court
moved tentatively in that direction, the political costs were heavy.21
The momentous effect of incorporation of the Bill of Rights crimi
nal procedure guarantees has passed under the radar screen of courts
and scholars. The problem is not just that state criminal defendants get
watered down versions of the Bill of Rights guarantees. Because of the
fiction of incorporation - the notion that there is now one national
standard for criminal procedure rights - the dilution of rights flowed
20. See supra note 15. Only one criminal procedure right was incorporated outside the
decade of the 1960s. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial).
21. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983) (discussing the po
litical furor created by the requirement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) that sus
pects be warned of a right to remain silent); Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule"
Miranda? 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883 (2000) (discussing the legal consequences of the political
reaction to Miranda); George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?:
On the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1
(2000) (discussing reaction of police and prosecutors to Miranda and speculating on impos
sibility of effectively regulating police interrogation practices).
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backward to the Bill of Rights guarantees. In effect, the process of in
corporation took a sledgehammer to the federal criminal procedure
guarantees. The Court has amended the Bill of Rights not once, but
eleven times - once for each criminal procedure guarantee incorpo
rated into the Fourteenth Amendment and later diluted in its applica
tion to federal cases.22 This amendment process is a fundamental his
torical mistake, one that Justice Harlan feared23 but that, with his
death, ceased to be mentioned by Court members or commentators.
Even if the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to mir
ror aspects of the Bill of Rights - even if they intended the doctrine
of "total incorporation"24 - no evidence exists that they intended the
federal Bill of Rights to become a fresh lump of clay for the Court to
refashion into a new, less protective body of doctrine.
The de facto amending of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure
guarantees has been a gradual process, so gradual that no one has no
ticed that the Court is using the Fourteenth Amendment to rewrite the
Bill of Rights rather than vice versa. First, the criminal procedure right
is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, accompanied by
great fanfare about protecting the rights of state defendants. Second,
the fact that States have exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes that
most affect our daily lives - from auto theft and assault to rape, rob
bery, and murder - causes the right to be gradually diluted in order
to permit States more latitude in investigating and prosecuting these
crimes. The third step is subtle indeed. Having told us that it is inter
preting the Bill of Rights in these state cases, the Court later follows
the new and narrower precedents when the issue arises in federal
court, often having to distinguish or overrule older, and broader, fed
eral precedents. This is no way to amend the Constitution.
Think of the Fourteenth Amendment as a lens projecting the Bill
of Rights upon the States. For the criminal procedure guarantees, the
lens is also a mirror. As the lens projects fundamental rights versions
of the criminal procedure guarantees onto the States, it also reflects
back onto the Bill of Rights, distorting their purpose as a barrier
against federal prosecutors and judges. The original Bill of Rights
criminal procedure guarantees - intended to establish a high wall
22. See supra note 15.
23. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (com
plaining that the majoritis acceptance of a six-person jury in a state case was a "backlash"
that "dilutes a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of 'incorporation,' . . . with
the reality of federalism").
24. A version of total incorporation was urged by Senator Howard when he reported a
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment out of committee. See infra text accompanying notes
218-219. It reads all the rights created by the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth
Amendment. On this view, States must provide a civil jury as guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment, must not abridge the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear arms," and
must not quarter troops in homes in violation of the Third Amendment.

152

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:145

with a narrow gate - has been reduced to an annoying speed bump
on a broad interstate that leads to a set of more or less accurate out
comes. The essence of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure guaran
tees has changed. Rather than a barrier designed to rein in powerful
federal actors, the guarantees have become a framework for assessing
the accuracy or fairness of the process. To take an example to which I
will return, the Court has replaced the absolute right to a speedy trial,
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, with a right to a trial that is
timely enough to be more or less accurate. The difference in these
conceptions of rights is that a trial more than five years after the de
fendant was arrested can be held, unanimously, to be "speedy."25
To understand the real effects of incorporation, we need to under
stand the worlds of criminal procedure before they collided. I will ex
amine the history and interpretation of the Bill of Rights and of the
Fourteenth Amendment during this premodern era to show how far
we have strayed from the vision of the Framers of our constitutional
protections. Part I summarizes the argument. Part II turns to the nine
teenth and early twentieth century to show that, when first faced with
the question of the permissible scope of federal investigation and
prosecution of crime, the federal courts placed severe restrictions on
the federal government. This discussion sets the stage for Part III,
where I present the historical case that the Framers of the Bill of
Rights intended them to be formidable barriers to the successful fed
eral prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or innocent.
The Framers feared that the powerful federal government would seek
to persecute its enemies through the use of federal law - that it would
achieve persecution by prosecution. This is what the Bill of Rights
criminal procedure provisions aimed to prevent. They were not de
signed with accuracy of outcome as the principal goal.
Part IV sketches an argument that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend the Amendment to make the criminal
procedure guarantees of the Bill of Rights a routine part of state
criminal processes, and that the ratifying state legislatures would have
found federal limits on their criminal processes particularly repug
nant.26 States and their colonial antecedents had long prided them
selves on their criminal law and criminal processes. It is highly unlikely
that they would have quietly ceded all authority to mold their criminal
procedure. Outside the South, little controversy attended the ratifica25. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1 972).
26. One might wonder whether deference to the intent of the ratifying state legislatures
dooms the modern Court's progressive doctrine on racial discrimination. The short answer is
no. As I will develop in more detail throughout the Article, the legislatures knew they were
ceding sovereignty in matters involving legal discrimination against the former slaves. That
they did not know the details of the resulting doctrine is no ground to claim its illegitimacy.
But if the States were not aware that they were accepting the Bill of Rights criminal proce
dure guarantees, then there are no details for later Courts to work out.
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment - a fact that casts doubt on the
claim that the ratifying state legislatures intended to impose, in one
fell swoop, a dozen new federal restrictions on their criminal proc
esses. If Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania, for ex
ample, had known that they were about to impose the federal model
on themselves and deprive their legislatures forever of the option to
have a criminal process different from the federal model, I believe that
the issue would have been discussed. The historical record contains
only silence.
In Part V, I argue that the traditional account of stare decisis per
mits the Court to "overrule" the criminal procedure incorporation
cases. The rulings that incorporated particular rights into the Four
teenth Amendment are, on a traditional understanding of precedent,
merely dicta. While disavowing dicta in these cases would be far from
easy, stare decisis would not prevent the Court from refashioning
strong Bill of Rights protections against the federal government, an
interpretation that would honor the Framers' skepticism and suspicion
of the central government. Part VI briefly surveys some ways this
thought experiment might change the protections against the federal
government. It sketches a new "road map" of the criminal procedure
guarantees that resolves several interpretive tensions in current doc
trine.
The net effect of my proposal would be to increase protection from
federal agents and prosecutors while leaving suspects and defendants
roughly where they are now when state actors investigate and prose
cute. This two-tiered interpretation is consistent with a century of
criminal procedure doctrine as well as the history surrounding the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also good policy. The
federal government has far more power to investigate, compel discov
ery, and generally manipulate our privacy and autonomy than the
state governments. We should not forsake protection against the pow
erful federal government to facilitate a more flexible set of restrictions
on state criminal processes. We can have both, as I hope to show in
what follows.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

Fear of the Central Government and Fear of Criminals

In 1880, a federal court for the Territory of Montana held that a
delay of barely six months violated the Sixth Amendment speedy trial
guarantee.27 The court viewed the rule as mechanical. It operated irre
spective of the reason for the delay and without regard to whether the
defendant's case was harmed. As that court put it, the "fact" of the
27. United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880).
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delay "is sufficient for the purposes of this case. "28 The federal crime
being prosecuted was making false entries in bank books. Compare
that holding to Barker v. Wingo,29 a state case in which the crime was
the murder of an elderly couple with a tire tool. The modern Court
held that a delay of five and one-half years did not violate the time
liness requirement embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
principal rationale in Barker was that the delay did not harm the de
fendant's case. In federal court, prior to incorporation at least, the rule
was mechanical. The trial was speedy or not without regard to other
criteria, such as whether the outcome was likely to be accurate. In
state cases, by contrast, the value of speedy trial is subsumed within
the larger value of accurate outcomes.
My project is a delicate one. First, I must persuade that, as a matter
of text, history, and policy, the criminal procedure protections should
receive a robust interpretation vis-a-vis the federal government - that
the 1880 Montana decision is a better reading of "speedy trial" than
Barker. If I achieve that goal, the reader would justifiably want to
know why the same robust protections should not also be available
against state power. Part of the answer is that States can, of course,
have the same (or greater) limitations either by statute or through an
interpretation of their constitutions. Indeed, as the United States
Supreme Court has steadily reduced some of the protections, States
have adopted more protective interpretations of state law, particularly
in the area of search and seizure.30
To those who want the Supreme Court to force greater protections
on the States, the answer, to be developed in more detail, is that States
in our system are sovereign except to the extent they surrendered that
sovereignty to the federal government in the Constitution and its
amendments.31 The Bill of Rights guarantees did not originally limit
the States. Thus, if the States did not intend to ratify a Fourteenth
Amendment that forced them to follow Bill of Rights criminal proce
dure - a reading of history that is at least plausible - then there is

28. Id. at 520.
29. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
30. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996) (rejecting Supreme Court's rule that
no Fourth Amendment interest exists in garbage in opaque bag placed on curb and still on
owner's property); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990) (same); State v. Boland, 800
P.2d 1 112 (Wash. 1990) (same).
31. I have no full-blown account of sovereignty but do not need one to make the argu
ment in this Article. I need an account only as it respects the right of the courts and legisla
tures to make and change criminal laws. Between the time English rule was thrown off and
the Articles of Confederation adopted, no institution existed that could design a procedure
for determining criminal guilt, or resolving civil cases for that matter, other than the courts
and legislatures of each State. The States must necessarily have retained the right to develop
court systems and processes to resolve cases except to the extent they ceded this sovereignty
by ratifying the Constitution and its amendments. It is in this sense that I use "sovereign."
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simply no basis to force the same kind of limits on the States that the
Bill of Rights creates against the federal government.
Some might say that history is not important here - that what is
important is the best set of policy outcomes. But that argument misses
a fundamental point about the structure of our federal government.
History performs a different function when the issue is state sover
eignty than when courts seek the best substantive interpretation of
particular guarantees. Suppose we found incontestable proof that the
Fourth Amendment was intended only to forbid Congress from
authorizing or the federal judiciary from issuing general warrants.32
Would that compel the Court to tear down its elaborate Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which is based on a completely different
understanding? The answer, I suggest, is no. Intentionalism is one tool
for interpreting the substantive contours of the Bill of Rights, but it is
only one tool. There is nothing illegitimate, or even problematic,
about the Court reading the Fourth Amendment to extend far beyond
the original concern with general warrants.
But intentionalism creates boundaries within which interpretation
can operate. Suppose we found incontestable proof that the ratifying
state legislatures understood the Fourteenth Amendment to have no
application to state criminal processes beyond ensuring that former
slaves were treated the same way as everyone else. Here I think it
much more difficult, and perhaps illegitimate, for the Court to ignore
the historical evidence. It is not a question of how best to understand
the substantive content of a right but, rather, who is required to pro
vide that right. And, as my sovereignty argument makes plain, the in
tent of the state legislatures cannot be ignored. The intent of the
Framers does not - indeed, cannot - trump that of the ratifying state
legislatures. If the States considered and rejected the idea that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the criminal procedure guaran
tees of the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to imagine the Court nonethe
less requiring the States to apply these guarantees.
One aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment that the States did rec
ognize was that it protected fundamental civil rights and equality un
der the law.33 Thus, the ratification of the Amendment leaves room for
the Court to interpret what those protections mean in a modern world.
On this account, Brown v. Board of Education34 is a perfectly appro
priate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment even though no
one could demonstrate that the Framers or the States contemplated
that particular application. The difference is between an emerging
32. Thomas Davies' recent proof of this historical understanding is a little less than in
contestable, but for me it is utterly convincing. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Origi
nal Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999).
33. See infra Part IV.
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"common law" interpretation of a right that the States unquestionably
agreed to provide and, if my reading of history is correct, the reality
that the States never agreed to bind themselves to the Bill of Rights.
In the latter case, there is no state obligation for the Court to inter
pret.
In construing the Bill of Rights, Akhil Amar has argued eloquently
that the document should be read as a whole, and that it should be
read in the context of the entire Constitution. Amar's actual reading
of the document, however, is less helpful. He reads the Bill of Rights'
guarantees to promote the goal of protecting innocent defendants
against wrongful convictions.35 Although one can read most of the
guarantees that way, I think Amar is wrong as a historical matter that
we should read the document in this way.36
Instead, the Bill of Rights is a profoundly antigovernment docu
ment that sought to impose restrictions on the federal government
without regard to the innocence of particular defendants. As Louis
Schwartz has suggested, the Framers almost surely intended the Bill of
Rights to permit guilty defendants to go free.37 After all, many of the
Framers themselves had violated British law. Thus, "many of these
[Bill of Rights] rules were written into the Constitution by real 'crimi
nals,' fresh from experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists and
traitors to the regime of George 111."38 As the violent reaction to the
Alien and Sedition Laws made clear, many of the Framers would have
wanted the Bill of Rights to frustrate the prosecution or conviction of
anyone charged with "publishing any false, scandalous and malicious
writing . . . against the government of the United States."39 The more a
defendant criticized the government, the more the anti-Federalists
would have wanted to protect him. Leonard Levy reports several in
stances of jury nullification producing acquittals of publishers and
printers prosecuted for common law seditious libel.40 Potential j ury
nullification must have been in the mind of the Framers when they in
sisted that the Sixth Amendment jury be drawn from the community.
Though sedition was a crime that was particularly sympathetic to the
anti-Federalists, they likely would have wanted to make the prosecu
tion and conviction of smugglers and tax evaders difficult as well.
35. See AKHIL REED AMAR,
(1997).
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36. George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L.
1819 (1997) (reviewing AMAR supra note 35).

REV.

,

37. Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U.
157, 158 (1954).
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38. Id.
39. THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, supra note 19, at 20 (reprinting Sedition Act
of 1798) (quoting Section 2).
40. See, e.g., LEONARD w. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 128, 157 (1985).
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The anti-Federalists were also influential in writing the body of the
Constitution. Fear of a powerful central government led the drafters
to give the new government specific powers, with the idea that all
other powers and functions remained with the States. The Tenth
Amendment makes this point expressly: powers not delegated to the
federal government were reserved to the States. To be sure, the
twentieth-century Court read the specified powers so broadly that it
obscured the vision of a government of limited powers. Recently,
however, the Court has rediscovered these limitations, holding, for ex
ample, in United States v. Morrison41 that the Commerce Clause does
not bestow power on Congress to create a civil remedy for rape. De
spite several cases putting limitations on the power of Congress to
legislate,42 the modern Court has yet to rediscover that the criminal
procedure provisions in the Bill of Rights are profoundly antigovern
ment. The reason for this myopia, as Part IV hopes to make clear, is
that the Court has been blinded by the mirror of incorporation.
The Constitution did not limit the central government only by im
plication. For example, in Article III we find this detailed, specific
limitation on the power of the federal government: "Treason against
the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Wit
nesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. "43 Also
in Article III: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach
ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where
the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .44 Other sections pro
hibited Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus,45 passing
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,46 and providing for the "cor
ruption of blood" in treason cases.47 All of these provisions suggest an
abiding concern with unjust federal laws and prosecutions.
When that was not enough to satisfy the anti-Federalists, the Bill
of Rights was proposed, drafted, submitted to the States, and ratified
41. 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
42. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amend
ment bars congressional creation of money damages in Americans with Disabilities Act);
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act did not validly abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits
by private individuals); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (explaining that
Congress lacks authority to expand judicial interpretations of constitutional rights); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds
Congress's Commerce Clause power).
43. U.S.
44 .

CONST.

art. III,§ 3, cl. 1 .

U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 , cl. 2 .

45. U.S. CONST. art I , § 9 , cl. 2 .
46. U.S. CONST. art I,§ 9 , cl. 3 .
47. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 3, cl. 2.
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on December 15, 1791. Consider these limitations as a whole. The
First Amendment granted freedom of thought and expression, as well
as the political right to assemble and petition the federal government.48
The Fifth Amendment guaranteed that private property would remain
sacrosanct - the government could take it only if it provided "just
compensation." Fearing a federal government gone berserk, the anti
Federalists included the Third Amendment to guarantee that its
troops would not inhabit our homes. Even more important, the Sec
ond Amendment sought to keep state militias as a viable force in op
posing the federal government: a state militia in that era depended on
citizens providing the weapons, and the Second Amendment forbids
Congress from infringing the "right to keep and bear Arms."
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments mostly have to
do with the power of the federal government to identify and punish
criminals, who, given the experience with the British, might be guilty
only of opposing the government. These provisions are rarely consid
ered in their rich historical context. The Fourth Amendment procla
mation of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei
zures" today seems to protect only drug traffickers and violent crimi
nals. The Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness
against oneself in a criminal trial might look to us like a clever way for
politicians to avoid admitting their mistakes and violations of the law.
The right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense could
be a hypertechnical protection for powerful criminals whose clever
lawyers can make one offense look the same as another.49
But consider the historical context. Imagine a powerful federal
government that wanted to eradicate its enemies. The legislature
might enact general search warrants that could be used to sweep
buildings, neighborhoods, and whole towns, looking not for evidence
of crimes of violence or theft but, instead, for evidence of opposition
to the government. In addition, a grand jury could subpoena those
suspected of harboring antigovernment sentiments and force them to
answer questions about their activities and their friends under threat
of contempt of court. We saw this use of the grand jury during the Red
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The right to petition, which sounds arcane to us, was in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a vital part of the dialog between the citizens and
the government. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Signifi
cance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998).
49. In the movie Double Jeopardy, for example, while the "criminal" seeking refuge in
the Double Jeopardy Clause was not powerful, she and her defrocked lawyer ally certainly
thought they were clever. DOU BLE JEOPARDY (Paramount Pictures 1999). They concluded
that her conviction for murdering her husband, who had disappeared, gave her double jeop
ardy protection if she killed him after he later turned out to be alive. The screen writers were
too clever by half here, asserting that a Washington state conviction provided double jeop
ardy protection if she killed him in New York or Louisiana. They obviously had not read, or
understood, Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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Scare in the 1950s. Once federal officers executed the general warrants
and compelled the testimony of "enemies," prosecutors could bring a
criminal prosecution in a corner of the State far from where the al
leged crime occurred; the defendant would be unknown and without
friends and resources to assist in his defense. If the j udge set bail im
possibly high, the defendant could be held in jail for months or years
waiting for the prosecution to proceed. When trial did finally begin,
under the supervision of a lax federal j udge, it could be done largely
by affidavit, as England had permitted for hundreds of years, without
a lawyer for the defendant and without access to subpoena power to
compel attendance of the defense witnesses. And if the defendant
somehow escaped with an acquittal, or with a sentence that the prose
cutor found too lenient, the prosecutor could prosecute the same of
fense all over again.
State prosecutors and j udges could do none of these things because
of the common law limitations under which they had labored for over
two centuries. But no one knew whether the common law would bind
the new federal government. From this perspective, we can see that
the villain in the Bill of Rights "drama" is not the criminal but the
government. One reason the criminal was not the villain is that the
contemplated federal criminal jurisdiction did not include the kind of
crimes that affected the daily lives of most Americans. Federal crimes
authorized in the Constitution are counterfeiting, piracy, felonies on
the high seas, offenses against the law of nations, treason, and brib
ery.50 The Constitution makes no provision for crimes of murder, rob
bery, or burglary; crimes of this type were the responsibility of the
States.
The federal government could be brought under control only by a
series of quite precise limitations on its power. Beyond the jury trial
right and the guarantee of habeas corpus in the body of the Constitu
tion, the Bill of Rights added a series of limitations on the federal
criminal process. The Fourth Amendment forbids general warrants.
The Fifth Amendment requires grand juries - an institution thought
in those days to be friendly to defendants who were being persecuted.
It also prohibits compelled self-incrimination and double jeopardy.
The Eighth Amendment forbids excessive bail. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to a speedy trial, to confront witnesses, to compel
the attendance of defense witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel.
The federal government had weapons in its arsenal beyond the
criminal process. When the general warrants disclosed alleged evi-

50. Article I, section 8 grants Congress authority to punish counterfeiting, piracy, felo
nies on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. Article III, section 3 confers
authority to punish treason. Treason and bribery are mentioned as grounds for impeachment
in Article II, section 4, along with the much-debated "other high Crimes and Misdemean
ors."
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dence of unpaid taxes and duties, for example, the federal prosecutor
could bring a civil proceeding asking for forfeiture or penalty. The de
fendant would have no right to a jury because Article III expressly
limits the jury trial right to criminal cases. The lax, biased, or corrupt
federal judge could therefore find for the government even when the
defendant could show that he was not liable for the tax or duty. Enter
the Seventh Amendment. The federal government is now forbidden to
punish its enemies by means of civil forfeiture or penalty unless a jury
agreed that the cause was just.
The principal concern in the Bill of Rights was not to protect inno
cent defendants. The Framers instead intended to create formidable
obstacles to federal investigation and prosecution of crime. An expan
sive protection against prosecution means, of course, that guilty as
well as innocent people go free, but the Framers expressed no concern
about this effect of the Bill of Rights. The anti-Federalists simply dis
trusted prosecutors who would advance the federal government's in
terests and federal judges who might be corrupt or biased against
those who did not pay proper obeisance to the federal government.
The odd historical twist on all of this is that the Framers can claim
something approaching total success in achieving the goal they set for
themselves: to keep Congress, the executive branch, and the federal
judiciary from systematically depriving defendants of these rights.
With only a few exceptions - the Alien and Sedition Laws, the in
ternment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II, the
McCarthy hearings during the 1950s - the federal government has re
spected the basic values manifested in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, it
goes beyond respect. It seems clear (though difficult to prove) that the
Congress and the federal judiciary (along with American citizens in
general) have internalized the values manifested in the Bill of Rights.
Ironically, the very success of the Framers in instilling in the
Congress and the courts the values that they held dear moved the de
bate from the macro stage (to prevent wholesale and blatant denials of
Bill of Rights guarantees) to the micro stage (how the rights should
limit police and prosecutors in individual cases). At the micro stage, of
course, defendants often are guilty, and the temptation is to construe
narrowly the guarantees as they manifest themselves in doctrine, par
ticularly those rights that impair accuracy of the criminal process. B ut
the micro issues play themselves out on two macro stages in our sys
tem - the state and federal judicial processes. To say that federal offi
cers should routinely get warrants before opening packages that were
properly seized is not to say that state officers should be required to
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do more than possess probable cause that the package contains con
traband or evidence of a crime.51
The eighteenth century fear and concern about the powerful cen
tral government did not extend to the States. The States and their co
lonial antecedents had been around for over 150 years. They had just
concluded a successful war against England. The Framers of the Con
stitution were influential figures in state government. That the Bill of
Rights did not apply to the States was confirmed in 1833 when Chief
Justice John Marshall, a member of the Virginia ratifying convention,
spoke for a unanimous Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore.52 The
States were bound by their own constitutions, of course, but nothing in
the Bill of Rights limited their power to investigate and prosecute
crime.
The next watershed event in American history was the Civil War.
The attempt by the Confederate States to leave the Union caused a
new concern in American political theory as the fear of balkanized
governments largely replaced the fear of a strong central government.
One concrete instantiation of this concern was a bill introduced in
Congress a year after the Civil War ended to change the name of the
country from the "United States of America" to "America." The bill
failed in the Judiciary Committee,53 but the Fourteenth Amendment
did pass, with its explicit (if not altogether clear) limitations on state
power.
Whatever the merits of the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Bill of Rights, Section 1 limits state criminal proc
esses directly. Much about the intent of the F�amers and ratifying state
legislatures is murky,54 but one aspect is clear. Everyone - propo
nents and opponents alike - understood Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to intrude significantly into state sovereignty. For exam
ple, Cabinet Secretary Browning, an opponent of the Amendment,
said in a widely printed letter that its object and purpose was "to sub
ordinate the State judiciaries in all things to Federal supervision and
control" under the heel of the "due process" requirement.55 Even if no

51. Compare United States v. Chadwick 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (requiring a warrant in a fed
eral case), with California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (requiring only probable cause in
a state case).
52. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
53. Proposed Change ofthe Name ofthe Government, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1866, at Al.
The Times commented: "No doubt the proposition will meet with more general favor at the
next session of Congress, when there will be fewer questions of greater moment to absorb
the attention of the national Legislature."
54. See infra Part IV.
55. CINCINNATI COM., Oct. 26, 1866, p. 2.
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one had contemplated incorporation, the States were required to pro
vide a criminal process that comported with due process.56
Determining the substantive content of "due process of law" in an
acceptably precise way is far from easy. Indeed, Justice Hugo Black
was a long-standing proponent of incorporation in part because he
thought it provided relatively specific guidance for judges. Black
feared that otherwise judges would roam at will through the vague
contours of due process and substitute their personal judgments for
those of democratically elected legislatures. He argued that if due pro
cess implicates "immutable principles of free government,'' as some
had suggested,57 the Fourteenth Amendment "might as well have been
written that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property ex
cept by laws that the judges of the United States Supreme Court shall
find to be consistent with the immutable principles of free govern
ment.' "58
Today, however, the very success of incorporation as an interpre
tive theory provides a relatively clear and stable benchmark for due
process in state cases. Thus, the only reworking of criminal procedure
doctrine required by my theory is to resurrect the robust protections
that the Framers intended to be available against federal actors. Most
of the current federal criminal procedure doctrine has been con
structed from state cases over the last four decades. Oddly enough,
most of what we know or think we know about the Bill of Rights
guarantees has been produced by cases in which the Court is inter
preting the Fourteenth Amendment. Incorporation has unintention
ally blinded the Court to the existence of separate worlds of criminal
procedure.
No one - Court or commentators - has noticed that criminal
procedure doctrine in the last forty years has largely come from state
cases. No one has noticed because everyone has taken at face value
the Court's repeated insistence that after incorporating a particular
Bill of Rights guarantee, it is then interpreting the language of the Bill
of Rights rather than that of the Fourteenth Amendment. B ut I wish
to challenge the assumption that the analytical methodology of incor-

56. For reasons having to do with the Court's unwillingness to overrule precedent, it has
chosen to use the Due Process Clause as the principal device to review state criminal justice
systems. Compare Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (asserting a very nar
row reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in a civil context), with Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (considering, but rejecting, the later claim that the lack of a
grand jury indictment would violate the Due Process Clause).
57. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (Cardozo, J., writing for
eight members of the Court) (due process includes the "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" (quoting Herbert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))).
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
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poration leads to the conclusion that the Court is interpreting the Bill
of Rights.
The assumption that the Court is "reading" the Bill of Rights in a
state case ignores Barron. As long as Barron is still the law - and the
Court has never suggested otherwise - the Bill of Rights' guarantees
do not apply to the States, and the text the Court interprets in state
cases is technically the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court is, of
course, free to say that the Fourteenth Amendment entirely swallows
up, for example, the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, and
that every interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment bearing on
double jeopardy at the same time interprets the Fifth Amendment.
Indeed, the Court has said precisely that.59 But the text being inter
preted in state cases is still the Fourteenth Amendment, and the nar
row holding of those cases is limited to the state context, or at least
that is my argument in Part V. My argument requires that we separate
the analytic structure of the Court's opinions, which claim to be inter
preting the language in the Bill of Rights, from the narrow holding of
these cases, which is only that the Fourteenth Amendment either
permits or denies the state the power to conduct its criminal process in
a particular way. On this view of the Court's criminal procedure doc
trine, the state cases are interpretations only of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Bill of Rights guarantees
themselves.
This view implicates current doctrine in two ways. First, the Court
now possesses a stable body of law defining "due process" - the state
cases that purport to be defining the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
Due process requires, for example, that States provide trials within the
period loosely defined by the Court in Barker v. Wingo,60 the case in
which the Court upheld a conviction despite a delay of five and one
half years from arrest to trial. The rationale for this unanimous hold
ing was essentially that the delay had not prejudiced the defendant's
case, a rationale that has as its goal accuracy rather than simply the
provision of the "speedy trial" the Sixth Amendment guarantees.61
The second implication of my view is that Barker v. Wingo is not
an interpretation of the speedy trial right in the Sixth Amendment.
Federal trials might have to meet a more rigorous standard for time
liness because they are covered by the "speedy trial" language of the
Sixth Amendment rather than the "due process" language of the
59. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
60. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
61. Justice Thomas noted this anomaly in his dissent in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.
647 (1992). Because Doggett was a federal case, Thomas is right to claim that prejudice to
the case should have been irrelevant. The government's real problem in Doggett was that the
delay between indictment and trial stretched past eight years, and that is difficult to square
with any common-sense meaning of "speedy."
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Fourteenth Amendment. One would hope that five and one-half years
is not a good working definition of "speedy."
The value of my approach is that it permits the Court to keep its
criminal procedure doctrine largely intact as a measure of due process
in the Fourteenth Amendment, while also freeing the Court to return
the Bill of Rights cfiminal procedure guarantees to their proper role as
formidable barriers against the federal government. A careful exami
nation of the state criminal procedure cases reveals that the Court has
been using a sort of due process test all along. The cases, time and
again, turn not on the interpretation of the language in the Bill of
Rights as much as on the question of whether the process in question
is likely to produce an accurate trial outcome or whether the investiga
tion was fair. As my speedy trial example made clear, what satisfies
due process in terms of accuracy or fairness would not necessarily, or
even often, be the best reading of the language of the Bill of Rights.
My proposed analytic structure presumes a maintenance of the
current level of protection in state cases. If freed from specific Bill of
Rights protections, the Court might, consciously or unconsciously,
weaken protection in state cases as a further accommodation of the
interest in convicting state criminal actors. But I think this weakening
is unlikely. The criminal procedure protections are already articulated
in generalized, due process language. For better or worse, state sus
pects and defendants today face due process precedents that are
"loose" enough to provide leeway for lower courts to seek fair and ac
curate outcomes in individual cases. Given this flexibility, and the in
stitutional disincentive to overrule well-established precedents, it is
unlikely that the Court would significantly weaken its due process
cases if it adopted my analytical structure, or that lower courts would
change their approach to the already loose guidelines that are in place.
In any event, I proceed on the assumption that the Court will maintain
the current criminal procedure doctrine developed in state cases as the
due process benchmark.
Many have weighed in on the issue of how best to understand the
Fourteenth Amendment.62 My project will cast a new light on the in
corporation debate. By starting at the beginning - prior to the colli
sion of the worlds of criminal procedure - we can better appreciate
what was at stake when the Court merged the two worlds. Only then
can we perceive the real effects of incorporation.
Two models of the Fourteenth Amendment are possible. One cre
ates a set of limitations on state actors that has no necessary connec
tion to the Bill of Rights. Under this model, courts would interpret the
Bill of Rights separately from the Fourteenth Amendment in every
case. The other model is incorporation. It requires courts to interpret
62. See infra Part IV.
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the Fourteenth Amendment as if it were the Bill of .Rights. It requires
courts to maintain the high barriers against prosecution and conviction
that the Framers created. The Court has never had the political will to
hamstring the States in that fashion, which is why I argue for a two-tier
interpretation that I believe is closer to the historical understanding of
both the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. My principal
point, however, is that the mirror of the Fourteenth Amendment has
distorted the picture of the Bill of Rights guarantees. We should re
adjust that picture.
My goal in the next two parts is to document the strong antigov
ernment premise of the original Bill of Rights criminal procedure
guarantees. Part IV then seeks to demonstrate that incorporation was
an interpretative and historical error. Part V provides a way out of this
mistake with an account of stare decisis that permits the Court to
change its mind without overruling any precedents. Part VI is a
thought experiment exploring how the Court might rebuild the high
barriers against the federal government. Barker v. Wingo might be a
sound interpretation of due process timeliness without telling us any
thing about Sixth Amendment speedy trial.
II.

SOME PRINCIPLES OF AUTONOMY AND PRIVACY

Barriers to Federal Investigations and Trials

Few cases involving the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of
Rights reached the Court prior to Prohibition, but the Court decided
these cases consistently with the notion that the barriers to federal in
vestigation, prosecution, and punishment should be high. In 1886,
Boyd v. United States63 reviewed a federal statute that permitted
prosecutors to subpoena business records - hardly an outrageous
idea by modern standards. The Court held that the Fourth Amend
ment and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
deprived Congress of the power to enact that legislation. The records
seized by subpoena could not be used in Boyd's civil forfeiture trial. In
justifying this broad protection, the Court wrote:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of consti
tutional liberty and security. They . . . apply to all invasions on the part of
the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the inva
sion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property [that constitutes the harm].64

63. 1 16 U.S. 616 (1886).
64. Id. at 630.
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According to the Supreme Court in 1886, the "indefeasible" right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property created a zone
of privacy that Congress could not breach, even to permit a prosecutor
to subpoena business records.
Morgan Cloud demonstrates that Boyd led inexorably to Weeks v.
United States,65 the first case to hold that a violation of the zone of pri
vacy had evidentiary consequences in criminal cases.66 Though Weeks
is often carelessly described as the first case to apply the exclusionary
rule, what it actually held was more fundamentally antigovernment.
Weeks did not move to suppress the letters and private documents
seized in his house in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Instead,
true to the property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment
then prevailing, Weeks moved for the return of his private papers.
Holding that the judge should have ordered the papers returned, the
Court implicitly found that Weeks had a property interest in his pa
pers superior to that of the government, a property interest that cre
ated a powerful zone of privacy.
Because the federal authorities had no search warrant in Weeks,
the question left for a later case was whether a search warrant would
permit federal agents to breach the Fourth Amendment zone of pri
vacy. If Boyd held that a subpoena could not defeat a superior prop
erty interest that the Fourth Amendment protects, there was no rea
son to think that a search warrant would fare any better. Indeed, as
between the two invasions of privacy, the search warrant is far more
intrusive because the agents enter the premises and search wherever
authorized by the warrant. The subpoena simply orders the recipient
to locate and produce the items requested. The resolution of the
search warrant issue was clouded, of course, by the Boyd Court's ap
parent reliance in part on the Fifth Amendment privilege. No one
knew whether the Fourth Amendment by itself created a zone of pri
vacy that a properly issued warrant could not breach.
The Court answered this question in Gouled v. United States.67
There, a Court that included Holmes and Brandeis held unanimously
that even a search warrant would not justify entry into a house or of
fice to search for papers or other property rightfully in the possession
of the owner of the premises. Citing Boyd, the Court wrote that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments "are to be regarded as of the very es
sence of constitutional liberty."68 It then held that search warrants
could authorize only searches for contraband, fruits of a crime, in-

65. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996).
66. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
67. 255 U.S. 298 (1921 ).
68. Id. at 303-04.
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strumentalities used in the commission of a crime, or items required
by law to be kept (as in records relating to articles on which excises
were due). The theory in Gouled, like Boyd and Weeks, was that the
government could search for and seize property only if it asserted a
property interest superior to that of the possessor of the property.
Boyd and Gouled, read together, suggest that the zone of privacy cre
ated by a property interest simply could not be breached by a federal
prosecutor or agent.69
In 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,70 the Court said that the "security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society. It is,
therefore, implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such en
forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause."71 The
Wolf majority refused, however, to compel the States to exclude evi
dence seized in violation of this due process privacy interest. That doc
trinal move occurred in 1961, when Mapp v. Ohio72 incorporated the
entire Fourth Amendment, including the exclusionary rule, into the
Due Process Clause.
Mapp was an easy case for suppression. The state court ignored a
series of severe infringements of Dollree Mapp's privacy interests. The
police surrounded her house, ignored her refusal to let them in, broke
down the door, and physically manhandled her when she demanded to
see the search warrant they claimed to have. They offered no warrant
at trial and sought to justify the admission of evidence on the ground
that Ohio did not recognize the exclusionary rule. In effect, the prose
cutor said, "It does not matter how egregiously the police invade the
privacy of an Ohio citizen. No evidence can ever be suppressed." Be
cause suppression looked like such a good idea in this case, the Court
could have taken a smaller step. It could have held, as in did in Rochin
v. California,73 that suppression was required under the Due Process
Clause because the circumstances in Mapp offended notions of justice
and fair play inherent in due process.
Instead, the Court chose another path, undoubtedly in the belief
that a more general threat of suppression would make state law as
protective of privacy as federal law. But Mapp has had precisely the
opposite effect, moving federal law in the direction of the pre Mapp
state law. An absolute zone of privacy for lawfully possessed property
·

-

69. Fourth Amendment privacy could be relinquished by its possessor through consent.
See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (dicta). Moreover, it did not extend to
all property. It did not, for example, protect "open fields." See Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57 (1924).
70. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
71. Id. at 27-28.
72. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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was the natural construction of the Fourth Amendment when federal
agents were investigating customs violations (Boyd), the mailing of
lottery tickets (Weeks), and the use of the mails to defraud the United
States ( Gouled). When faced with state police chasing a robbery sus
pect into a house, however, the most natural construction was to em
phasize the State's interest in preventing and solving crime. Gouled
was a casualty of incorporation.
As Justice Brennan said for eight members of the Court in reject
ing the premise of Gouled, "The requirement that the Government as
sert . . . some property interest in material it seizes has long been a fic
tion, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving
crime."74 This of course ignores the pre-incorporation purpose and
goal of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure guarantees. The Court's
opinions in Boyd, Weeks, and Gouled do not once refer to the gov
ernment's interest in solving crime. More importantly, the entire his
tory of the debates surrounding the Bill of Rights contains not a single
reference to the importance of enabling the crime-solving function of
the federal government.
Many reasons explain this shift in the Court's attitude. One is that
the fear of the central government had, by the 1960s, largely been re
placed by a fear of criminals. In addition, solving the crime of mailing
lottery tickets or not paying duties on a few pieces of glass simply
pales in comparison to the interest in solving the crimes of rape, rob
bery, and murder. By broadening the Fourth Amendment in 1961 to
protect those who committed violent state crimes, the Court truncated
the very protections it attempted to impose on the States.
Whether or not Boyd sensibly interprets the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments,75 the Court today no longer holds in such high esteem
the "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and pri
vate property" that the nineteenth century Court found in the Bill of
Rights. Justice Brandeis said that Boyd was "a case that will be re
membered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."76 It may
be remembered today, but the modern Court has dismantled Boyd's
zone of privacy without acknowledging the reasons the Framers cre
ated a high barrier against federal intrusion.
The search warrant requirement is another Fourth Amendment
protection that has all but evaporated since incorporation. As long as
Gouled was the law, warrants were limited to items that the suspect
had no right to possess. Even then, the Court insisted that search war
rants should be obtained when possible. Two categorical exceptions to

74. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 (1 967). Only Justice Douglas dissented.
75. For an intriguing view that Boyd represents an admirable blend of formalism and
pragmatism, see Cloud, supra note 65.
76. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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this rule existed in the pre-1961 world: searches incident to arrest77 and
searches of vehicles if the agents had probable cause to stop and
search the vehicle.78 Today, roughly twenty-four exceptions to this
"warrant requirement" exist, discovered by the Court largely in cases
coming from state courts.79 While other causes undoubtedly played a
part in the decline of the warrant requirement, incorporation was a
crucial cause, one that has not been acknowledged.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail all the ways in which
federal criminal procedure rights have eroded in the modern era. We
have already seen that compulsory process now receives a less robust
interpretation than when Chief Justice Marshall was determining how
it protected federal defendants accused of treason. We have seen that,
in the federal courts in the nineteenth century, speedy trial meant a
trial conducted in a prompt fashion, rather than a trial likely to have
convicted a guilty defendant, as it is understood today.
Prior to incorporation, the Court interpreted broadly the Sixth
Amendment right to confront the prosecution's witnesses. In 1900, the
Court unanimously held inadmissible the preliminary hearing testi
mony of a witness who did not appear at trial.80 The Court's opinion,
by the first Justice Harlan, drew from Cooley's Treatise on Constitu
tional Limitations a rule that required sworn testimony in another pro
ceeding, the chance to cross-examine, and proof that the witness is
currently unavailable because he is "deceased, or is insane, or sick and
unable to testify, or has been summoned but appears to have been
kept away by the opposite party."81 This rule had teeth. Since incorpo
ration, by contrast, the rule is that witnesses need not appear to testify
if their absence can be explained by any of the "firmly entrenched"
exceptions to the hearsay rule.82 This means, for example, that hearsay
utterances of a co-conspirator can be admitted without offering the
witness to testify even though he is available.83 This is a much weaker
rule than the Court applied in 1 900. Incorporation is part of the cause.

77. The Court went back and forth on the permissible scope of searches incident to ar
rest. For a good discussion of the Court's vacillating attitude toward this exception, see
Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
78. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
79. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1473 nn.23-44 (1985) (mentioning twenty-two exceptions); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (adding two exceptions). Of the twenty-four ex
ceptions, eighteen were announced in cases coming to the Court from state courts.
80. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
81. Id. at 472 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS *318).
82. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
83. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion).
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Another demonstration of the unintended effect of incorporation
is the plight of the jury of twelve. In Thompson v. Utah,84 the Court es
tablished that when the Framers created a right to trial by jury in the
Sixth Amendment, they meant a jury of twelve. Not eleven. Twelve.
Thompson was emphatically reaffirmed in Patton v. United States:85
A constitutional jury means twelve men as though that number had been
specifically named; and it follows that when reduced to eleven it ceases
to be such a jury quite as though the number had been reduced to a sin
gle person . . . . To uphold the voluntary reduction of a jury from twelve
to eleven upon the ground that the reduction - though it destroys the
jury of the Constitution - is only a slight reduction, is not to interpret
that instrument but to disregard it.86

Patton was being tried by a panel of twelve jurors when one be
came severely ill. With the consent of the both sides, the requirement
of a twelve-person jury was waived and a panel of eleven completed
the trial, returning a guilty verdict. Due to dicta in Thompson, the
lower court had been unsure whether a twelve-person jury was wai
vable with the parties' consent. The Court held that a federal j ury, or
any portion thereof, "is not to be discharged as a mere matter of
rote."87 Justice Sutherland emphasized:
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury
be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding
body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our
traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of
government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addi
tion to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant.88

Unless this rigorous waiver standard was met, twelve jurors were
required for a constitutional jury. And the twelve-vote verdict had to
be unanimous.89 These cases make clear that the federal jury require
ment was not to be taken lightly. And it was not taken lightly for over
fifty years. The principles of Thompson and Patton remained "jeal
ously preserved" until June 22, 1 970. On that day the Court sacrificed
the twelve-person federal jury on the altar of incorporation in
Williams v. Florida,90 holding that a six-person jury is constitutional in
84. 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
85. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
86. Id. at 292.
87. Id. at 312.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in federal
civil cases. Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707 (1897). It follows from that holding that
unanimous verdicts are required in federal criminal cases, but the issue has never been
joined because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have always required a unanimous
verdict.
90. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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a state case. I will later argue that the technical holding in Williams is
limited to an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment because
that is the relevant text the Court was interpreting. B ut the Court said
the year before, in Benton v. Maryland,91 that "[o]nce it is decided that
a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,' . . . the same constitutional standards apply against
both the State and Federal Govemments."92 Moreover, in Williams, the
Court said it was interpreting the Sixth Amendment: "Our holding
does no more than leave these [policy] considerations to Congress and
the States, unrestrained by an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
that would forever dictate the precise number that can constitute a
,,
jury. 93
In Williams, the Court first distilled the j ury trial right to its "essen
tial feature" of "the interposition between the accused and his accuser
of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen."94 The Court
then explained:
The performance of this role is not a function of the particular number of
the body that makes up the jury. . . . We do not pretend to be able to di
vine precisely what the word 'jury' imported to the Framers, the First
Congress, or the States in 1789.95

Perhaps Williams is correct that the Framers had no particular number
in mind. If so, then Thompson and Patton were mistaken. But the
point for this Article is that the twelve-person jury was the uncontro
versial understanding of the Framers' intent for over seventy years.
And when it was summarily rejected, it was in a state case arising un
der the Due Process Clause.
In his Williams concurrence, Justice Harlan argued - quite cor
rectly, it seems to me - that the Bill of Rights was being "watered
down" in its application to the States. Justice Black, as usual, dis
agreed with Harlan on the incorporation issue: "This assertion finds
no support in today's decision or any other decision of this Court. We
have emphatically 'rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amend
ment applies to the States only a 'watered down, subjective version of
the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.' "96 Furthermore, "[t]he
broad implications in early cases indicating that only a body of 12
members could satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement arose in

91. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
92. Id. at 795 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)) (emphasis added).
93. Williams, 399 U.S. at 103.
94. Id. at 100.
95. Id. at 98, 100.
96. Id. at 106-07 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964)). Justice Black may
be right. Lowering the federal jury standard from twelve to six may not be watering down. It
seems more like drowning in a flood.
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situations where the issue was not squarely presented and were based,
in my opinion, on an improper interpretation of that amendment."97
Black's attitude toward Thompson parallels that of Brennan to
ward Gouled. In both cases, the writer discredits the reasoning of the
precedent and ignores the history that led to the holding. Moreover,
both opinions undervalue the Framers' goal of having high barriers
against federal prosecutors and judges. This leads to the historical mis
take inherent in the notion of incorporation and thereby diminishes
the Bill of Rights.
To be sure, it is not only incorporation that can explain the Court's
increasingly hostile attitude toward the Bill of Rights' criminal proce
dure guarantees. The character and role of the federal government
began to change in the twentieth century. By the time of Franklin
Roosevelt's election, and certainly by the beginning of World War II,
most Americans had a benevolent, or at least hopeful, view of the fed
eral government. In addition, as I have indicated, most federal crimes
in the nineteenth century were nonviolent and economic in nature.
Strong Bill of Rights protections therefore did not noticeably affect
the public safety. But the beginning of the twentieth century saw the
rise of organized crime and the difficulty of enforcing Prohibition,
which at least in the beginning was a popular law.98 The need to con
trol gangsters and enforce sobriety required a strong federal response
and also acted as a hydraulic that led the Court to narrow the rights of
privacy and autonomy that underlie the criminal procedure guaran
tees. The expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction continues to this
day. It is, for example, a federal crime for a store to remove a mattress
tag.99 The Framers would have thought the entire country quite daft to
permit such a law to stand.
But incorporation is related to the other causes and is at least as
significant in reducing the scope of the protections. The Court began
the full-scale process of incorporating the criminal procedure guaran
tees in 1961. By the time it finished in 1970, the nation had come
through a social upheaval unlike anything since the Great Depression.
Crime rates had risen dramatically. Many people, and thus many poli
ticians, had grown increasingly unhappy with anything that could be
characterized as a "right of criminals." Richard Nixon campaigned on
a "law and order" theme during the 1968 election, offering a velvet

97. Id. at 107.
98. Note, for example, the Court's expansive construction of the rights to search under
the Prohibition Act, and the language supporting the Act, in Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 192, 1 196 (1994); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1632.31(b)(l), 132.31(b)(5) (1997); see
Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and
the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 & n.264 (1997).
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glove alternative to George Wallace's mailed fist.100 Wallace said the
Supreme Court was a "sorry, lousy, no-account outfit," and he prom
ised that if he were elected president "you wouldn't get raped or
stabbed in the shadow of the White House even if we had to call out
30,000 troops and equip them with two-foot-long bayonets and station
them every few feet apart."101 Not even Democratic presidential can
didate Hubert Humphrey defended the Supreme Court's criminal
procedure decisions.
The crimes Americans fear most - everyday property crimes and
crimes of violence - have always been the responsibility of local po
lice and prosecutors. The modern Court's instinct has been to seek
ways to make it easier for police and prosecutors to solve these kinds
of crimes and convict the perpetrators. But the Framers were not con
cerned with the government's interest in solving crime. While we to
day fear criminals, the Framers feared the central government.
Recall Barker v. Wingo, the case unanimously holding that a trial
was speedy even though held five and one-half years following arrest.
The Court began its recitation of the facts with, "[o]n July 20, 1958, in
Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death by
intruders wielding an iron tire tool."102 If the Court had found the de
lay to violate Barker's right to a speedy trial, the only remedy would
have been to reverse the conviction without remand for a new trial. A
speedy trial violation cannot be remedied by giving the defendant a
second, later trial. The defendant, a convicted murderer, must walk
free.
Given this extreme remedy, consider how much easier it was for a
later Court to find a speedy trial violation in a federal case where the
conviction was for conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine.103 As
serious as the distribution of drugs might be, setting free a man con
victed of murdering elderly people in their homes with a tire tool is far
more difficult. Faced with the prospect of releasing murderers, rob
bers, and rapists in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court "blinked" and be
gan to shrink the criminal procedure protections available in state
court.104 But in a world with a one-size-fits-all incorporation doctrine,
federal prosecutors also benefit from the lowered barriers, thus mak100. The characterization is Liva Baker's. LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND
POLITICS 244 (1983).
101. Id. at 243.
102. 407 U.S. at 516.
103. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). The delay in this case was eight
years, but I don't see much difference in terms of "speedy" between a delay of five and one
half years and a delay of eight years.
104. Of course, Richard Nixon became President in 1969 and began to appoint lawyers
with a more conservative philosophy to the Court, but I believe the Court was inevitably
going to retreat from the expansive federal model as it faced the consequences of applying
those doctrines to state criminal cases.
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ing it easier for them to obtain convictions through the use of hearsay
evidence, wiretapping, and questionable interrogation techniques. The
Framers would have viewed this alien world and wondered why they
bothered to write a Bill of Rights. What is striking about the Court's
decision to force criminal procedure into a single track is that it oc
curred without any discussion of whether it was a good idea for a local
cop and prosecutor to have to pass the same hurdles as their federal
counterparts.
Identifying the precise cause that has produced a stunted set of
criminal procedure guarantees is impossible. For example, as enforced
sobriety became less popular and use of other recreational drugs in
creased, the government would increasingly be seen by some citizens
as more, not less, hostile. Indeed, the federal war on drugs will some
times be a counter-example to points I make in this Article. For ex
ample, when I argue that an expanded search warrant requirement
would not unduly burden federal law enforcement, one rejoinder is,
"What about the war on drugs?" In the wake of the September 11,
2001, attack, the same question can be asked, with more urgency,
about the war on terrorism.
This is a fair question. It would, however, take another paper to
work through in detail the implications of a more robust interpretation
of the criminal procedure guarantees in the federal criminal process.
To say that the Court should return to the original understanding of a
more expansive Bill of Rights protection in the federal system is not
necessarily to say that the Court should return to Boyd or Gouled. The
world is different in 2001. The role of federal criminal law is far larger
and is unlikely to retrench significantly. Though Part VI tentatively
suggests some ways federal criminal procedure might be more protec
tive than current doctrine, I make no effort to accommodate special
federal law enforcement needs such as enforcing the drug laws, at
tempting to control organized crime, or combating terrorism.
Ill. VALVES UNDERLYING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Hobbling the Powerful Federal Government

We have come to believe, because it has been repeated over and
over, that the reason to have protections benefiting criminals is that
these protections best deliver accurate verdicts that separate the guilty
- the real criminals - from the innocent. This argument is reiterated
endlessly because it is thought to be a good defense against the crime
control adherents who would abolish or limit criminal procedure
rights. Unfortunately, it poorly explains the Framers' insistence on the
criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
The Framers did not focus on separating the guilty from the inno
cent because they were concerned with curtailing the power of federal
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prosecutors and j udges. I do not claim that innocence was irrelevant. I
claim, instead, that when framing the Bill of Rights, the Framers un
derstood "innocence" differently than we understand it in the context
of today's property crimes and crimes of violence. Today we mean
"factually innocent of the relevant wrongdoing." The Framers sought
to protect the "innocence" of those against whom the central govern
ment might improperly seek criminal or civil penalties. Whether a par
ticular citizen was factually guilty of evading duties or of seditious libel
was less important to the Framers than restraining the ability of the
federal government to obtain wholesale convictions for what seemed
to them little more than antigovernment conduct.
Consider the Fourth Amendment. If protecting factual innocence
were its principal goal, no particular reason compels us to ban general
warrants. Innocent people have nothing to fear from warrants, general
or otherwise. And general warrants are an efficient way to sort the fac
tually guilty from the innocent. The Fourth Amendment bans general
warrants because they manifest raw government power over our lives,
because they subordinate the citizen to the government, and because
they permit wholesale convictions for antigovernment conduct.
The criminal procedure provisions that best advance the goal of
accurate verdicts are the Sixth Amendment rights to notice of the na
ture and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with adverse wit
nesses, and to have compulsory process for obtaining favorable wit
nesses. Yet the Framers said very little about these accuracy
enhancing rights. Leaving aside the special case of treason, the only
two criminal procedure guarantees in the body of the Constitution are
two that have little to do with factual innocence - the right to a jury
trial and the writ of habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus, as understood in the eighteenth century, was not a
mechanism to re-examine the accuracy of the outcome. Rather, it was
a way to test whether the court that entered the conviction had juris
diction. A court could lack j urisdiction because the offense was a "pre
tended" one - the Declaration of Independence accused King
George III of trying colonists of "pretended offences"105 - or because
the prosecutor had brought the charge in the wrong court, presumably
to obtain an advantage. In either case, a conviction would represent a
highly arbitrary use of power that was objectionable not because the
accused was factually innocent but simply because the crown should
not obtain convictions in that manner.
Most of the debate that led to the Bill of Rights was over trial by
jury, an odd historical fact if protecting innocence were uppermost in
the minds of the Framers. No one claims now - indeed, no one
claimed in the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right in 1627, or the

105.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 21 (U .s. 1776).

176

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 100:145

Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641 - that juries are uniquely
qualified to deliver the truth about factual guilt.106 Moreover, Article
III already contained a right to trial by j ury in criminal cases. A com
parison of the relevant provisions is instructive. Article III requires
that " [t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been commit
ted."107 The Sixth Amendment requires that crimes be tried by a jury
"of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit
ted." The Seventh Amendment requires trial by jury in "Suits at
common law" and forbids the reexamination of any fact found by a
jury. What the Framers found missing in Article III was the right to a
trial in civil cases, with the jury as ultimate factfinder, and the right to
a criminal jury from the "district" rather than the state. Richard Henry
Lee's proposed amendments of October 16, 1787 put the concern this
way:
That the trial by jury in criminal and civil cases, and the modes pre
scribed by the common law for safety of life in criminal prosecutions
shall be held sacred - . . . . That such parts of the new constitution be
amended as provide imperfectly for the trial of criminals by a jury of the
vicinage, and to supply the omission of a jury trial in civil cases or dis
putes about property between individuals where by the common law is
directed, and as generally it is secured by the several State constitu
tions.108

But why would these concerns cause the jury trial issue to domi
nate the debate on amending the Constitution? The Constitution in
1787 contained no right to counsel, no Fourth Amendment, no right to
subpoena witnesses, no right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation. It did contain a right to trial by jury. Even if one
thought the expression of the right imperfect, surely the complete lack
of the other protections should be of more concern. But it was cor
recting the Article III jury right that was the passion of the antiFederalists.
To understand this phenomenon, consider the role of the jury in
the colonies. When rebels against the Crown were tried for evading
customs duties, or for some offense made up by the Crown, the jury
·

106. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (noting that waivers of jury
trials are acceptable and that States can refuse to provide jury trials for petty offenses ) .
107. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
108. NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 415 (1997) (quoting VIRGINIA
GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 1787). Cogan's work is a genuine treasure. It includes many sources be
yond the congressional debates on the Bill of Rights, including the debates in the state leg
islatures that proposed amendments to the Constitution and selections from pamphlets,
newspapers, letters, and other sources that are difficult to locate. Cogan checked original
sources in all cases, restoring the original spelling, capitalization, and use of italics that in
some cases over the years had been modernized. Because of the quality of Cogan's work, I
did not check original sources in most cases and simply cite to Cogan.
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often acquitted even though the accused was guilty. The colonists
wanted not truth as much as the voice and the law of the community.
This can be seen in a resolution of the First Continental Congress:
"Resolved . . That the respective colonies are entitled to the common
law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the
course of that law."109 The law to be applied was local, and the judg
ment to be made by the peers of the vicinage.
Other than questions of convenience, why would it matter that the
defendant was tried in a far comer of the state where he was not
known by the jurors? The goal is not likely to be protecting the inno
cent. One could conjure up all sorts of theories about distant juries
being easier for powerful federal prosecutors to manipulate, but any
gain for the protection of innocence from local venue seems marginal
at best. John Marshall sought to quell the concern about potential
abuses of power by federal juries by asking what we would ask today:
why would a jury of strangers be "the tools and officers of the gov
ernment"? More fundamentally as to civil cases, "What is it to the
government whether this man or that succeeds [in a civil suit]? It is all
one thing." 1 10
So what was different about local juries? One real difference is that
local jurors would be more likely to know the witnesses and their
character as well as the character of the defendant. Eighteenth
century rules of evidence and procedure permitted inquiry into the
character of the defendant and also forbade the defendant from testi
fying under oath.11 1 Thus, one way the jury could better "see" the de
fendant's side of the dispute from his personal vantage point was to
know the defendant. In the words of Patrick Henry:
.

Why do we love this trial by jury? Because it prevents the hand of op
pression from cutting you off. They may call any thing rebellion, and de
prive you of a fair trial by an impartial jury of your neighbors. Has not
your mother country magnanimously preserved this noble privilege up
wards of a thousand years? . . . This gives me comfort - that as long as I
have existence, my neighbors will protect me. Old as I am, it is probable
that I may yet have the appellation of rebel.112

Whatever the reason the Framers found the Article III jury trial
right inadequate, they were determined to interpose the community
between the citizens and the central government as a way to place
stringent limitations on the federal government. Indeed, Luther
Martin concluded that the inadequacy of the Article III jury right did
109. Id. at 414.
1 10. Id. at 439.
1 1 1 . See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359-60.
1 12. COGAN, supra note 108, at 438.
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not arise from "inattention" or "any real difficulty in establishing and
securing jury trials by the proposed constitution" but because the Fed
eralists did not trust state juries to decide disputes involving the fed
eral government.1 13 He argued that the right to a jury trial "is most es
sential for our liberty, to have it sacredly guarded and preserved" in
"every case whether civil or criminal between government and its offi
cers on the one part and the subject or citizen on the other." 1 14 Thus,
answering John Marshall, the real difficulty with Article Ill's lack of
the civil jury trial right was not so much when individual sued individ
ual but when the government sought a fine, penalty, or forfeiture.
James Iredell noted that "the great instrument of arbitrary power
is criminal prosecutions." There is, he continued, "no other safe mode
to try these but by a jury," thus avoiding "the control of arbitrary
judges."115 Even more precise, and perceptive, was the observation by
James Wilson: "There is another advantage annexed to the trial by
jury; the jurors may indeed return a mistaken or ill-founded verdict,
but their errors cannot be systematical."116 Implicit in this observation,
of course, is the fear that judges would make errors that favored the
government. Unlike today, when federal judges are held in high re
gard, to the Framers they represented a potential return to the tyranny
of British rule.
Many other, more general attacks were made on the new central
government. Patrick Henry said that without a Bill of Rights, " [i]f
[citizens] dare oppose the hands of tyrannical power, you will see what
has been practised elsewhere. They may be tried by the most partial
powers, by their most implacable enemies, and be sentenced and put
to death, with all the forms of a fair trial."117 "Philadelphiensis" wrote,
"To such lengths have these bold conspirators [the Federalists] carried
their scheme of despotism, that your most sacred rights and privileges
are surrendered at discretion." 1 18 The political commentator, "An Old
Whig," accused the Federalists of wishing "to enslave the people."11 9
Consider a list of the terms used to describe the central govern
ment or the new Constitution: "hand of oppression," "congressional
oppression" and "tyrannical power";120 "arbitrary power" and "arbi1 1 3. Id. at 465; see also id. at 472 (Martin argued that the same reason influenced the
Federalists to provide an inadequate jury trial right as influenced them to create inferior
federal courts: "they could not trust State judges, so they would not confide in State juries. ").
1 14. Id. at 465.
1 1 5. Id. at 426.
1 16. Id. at 428.
1 17. Id. at 436.
1 18. Id. at 465.
1 1 9. Id. at 466.
120. Id. at 438, 436 (Patrick Henry).
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trary judges";121 "scheme of despotism";122 "bad and arbitrary rul
ers";123 "fangs of power"; "intolerable oppression";124 "despots," "an
infernal junto," and "absolute monarchy";125 "wicked" judges and Star
Chamber.126 Perhaps the feelings are best summed up by Patrick
Henry: "As this government stands, I despise and abhor it."127
These statements were, of course, made by the anti-Federalists, but
the anti-Federalists were largely responsible for the Bill of Rights. Do
these statements suggest a concern with enabling the federal govern
ment to solve crimes, to separate the guilty from the innocent? I think
not. A fair reading of the text and history suggests that the writing and
ratification of the Bill of Rights manifested a hatred and fear of the
federal government. The point to the Bill of Rights, then, was to make
it difficult for the federal government to deny bail, to convict anyone
of a federal crime, or to subject anyone to forfeiture, fines, and civil
penalties. The express concern was that the federal government would
use its immense power to persecute its enemies. The memory of
Parliament and King George III was still fresh in the minds of the
Framers.
The "glue" that holds the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guar
antees together is the goal of making it as difficult as possible for the
new federal government to pursue its enemies. This was why the right
to a jury trial conducted in the vicinage was of paramount importance
to the Framers. Implicit in much of the debate is the assumption that a
jury who knows the defendant's character will nullify a prosecution
that was viewed as overreaching on the part of the federal govern
ment, without regard to whether the defendant was factually guilty.
Viewed in this light, it was important that the jury consist of twelve
and that its verdict be unanimous, notwithstanding the modern protes
tations of the Court in cases coming from state courts.
Look at the other ways the central government was hobbled. It
could not obtain search warrants unless it persuaded a magistrate that
it had probable cause to look for specific evidence of a particular
crime. It could not deprive the state militias of the weapons they
would need to oppose a federal government that was threatening the
liberty of state citizens. It could not appropriate private property for
its own use without just compensation. It could not begin a prosecu
tion without the j udgment of a group of citizens, represented in an in121. Id. at 426 (Iredell).
122. Id. at 465 ("Philadelphiensis").
123. Id. at 450 ("Cincinnatus").
124. Id. at 468 ("Brutus").
125. Id. at 463 ("Philadelphiensis").
126. Id. at 422 (Tredwell).
127. Id. at 438.
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dictment, that there was reason to proceed. It could not hold defen
dants prior to trial by demanding excessive bail or postpone trial in
definitely. It could not compel citizens to testify against themselves. It
could not deny the assistance of counsel or any of the other accuracy
enhancing rights (notice of the charges, compulsory process, confron
tation). It could not try a defendant a second time hoping for a differ
ent verdict or heavier penalty, nor could it impose cruel and unusual
punishments. It could not seek to use civil fines and forfeiture to pe
nalize defendants without persuading a jury of the justness of its cause.
As Boyd and Gouled make plain, the early Court understood the
concerns of the Framers and interpreted the criminal procedure provi
sions in this context. Some of the barriers were so high that they were
literally insurmountable - lawfully possessed property inside the
house was immune from federal seizure. Trials had to be speedy.
Compulsory process was interpreted broadly. The only exception rec
ognized to the right of confrontation was when the witness was un
available.
None of these high barriers applied to the States. The anti
Federalists who pressed the Bill of Rights to limit federal power saw
state legislatures and state courts as the protectors of citizens· and not
as threats. Until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Consti
tution placed no limits on the power of the States to fashion their own
criminal processes. That would change, of course, but not for almost
one hundred years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. One
question worth mulling as we consider the Fourteenth Amendment is,
what did the Warren Court know in the 1960s that no other Court
knew from 1868 until 1961?
IV. VALUES UNDERLYING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Paying A ttention to History

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.1 28

Lawyers love interpretational puzzles, and Section 1 provides four
challenges. What are "privileges or immunities?" What is "due process
of law?" "Equal protection of the laws?" Why does the privileges or

128.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 .
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immumttes guarantee extend only to citizens while all persons are
guaranteed due process and equal protection?
Much ink has been spilled seeking to uncover the . "intent" of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue in modern times is
whether or to what extent the Fourteenth Amendment applied the
Bill of Rights guarantees to the States. As the Article to this point has
made clear, the Framers of the Bill of Rights intended to limit only the
federal government. But fear of the federal government was supple
mented, in the aftermath of the Civil War, by a fear of runaway States,
and it would be natural for Congress to seek limits on States. The
Fourteenth Amendment did this, without question. But did Congress
intend to propose, and the States intend to ratify, the precise limits in
the Bill of Rights? The classic debate was between Charles Fairman, 1 29
a supporter of Justice Frankfurter and his nonincorporation theory,
and William Crosskey,130 stating the incorporationist views of Justice
Black. Later versions of the debate include Michael Curtis, Richard
Aynes, Kevin Newsom, and Bryan Wildenthal,1 31 who seem solidly in
Crosskey's camp; and Raoul Berger and Donald Dripps, who roughly
follow Fairman. Then there are the historical treatments that either
report no substantial evidence of incorporation or treat that issue as
not very important - books by James E. Bond, Joseph James, Earl
Maltz, William Nelson, and Joseph Sneed. 132
Two new theories of incorporation have appeared in the last few
years. Akhil Amar introduced "refined incorporation" to the de
bate,1 33 while William Nelson mentions almost in passing a new under
standing of what the author of Section 1, John Bingham, might have

129. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
130. William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, " and the Con
stitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954).
131. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); Richard L. Aynes,
On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993);
Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compro
mise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill
ofRights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051 (2000). Newsom goes so far as
to claim that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment "clearly said" that it would incor
porate the Bill of Rights. For my skeptical view of that claim, see the balance of this Part.
132. JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM (1997); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984) [hereinafter JAMES,
RATIFICATION]; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1956) [hereinafter JAMES, FRAMING]; EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL R IGHTS, THE CONSTITU
TION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); JOSEPH T.
SNEED III, FOOTPRINTS ON THE ROCKS OF THE MOUNTAIN (1997).
133. AMAR, supra note 18, at 215-94; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).

182

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:145

meant by incorporation.134 Canvassing in detail the relevant evidence
about the various theories, and the huge body of scholarship, is be
yond the scope of my project - indeed, merely summarizing the evi
dence and arguments takes fully half the length of this Article - but I
will sketch the history as it is relevant to my arguments.
To put the issue in a conceptual context, consider how the Framers
and ratifying state legislatures might have understood incorporation. If
the point to the Fourteenth Amendment was, as Senator Jacob
Howard of Michigan asserted when he introduced the amendment to
the Senate,135 to incorporate in one fell swoop the words of the Bill of
Rights as "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,"
then the only coherent understanding of the relationship between the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is what is called "total
incorporation."136 No one in Congress, no state legislator, and no con
temporary commentator noted any hierarchy or privileged list of the
Bill of Rights guarantees that would allow some, but not all, to be read
into the Fourteenth Amendment. If the States knew that total incor
poration was the core meaning of "privileges or immunities," the rati
fying legislatures intended to impose on themselves the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases, the Fifth Amendment
right to a grand j ury indictment, the Eighth Amendment prohibition
of excessive bail, the Fifth Amendment prohibition of taking private
property without just compensation, the Second Amendment right for
militia members to keep and bear arms, and the Third Amendment
prohibition of quartering troops in houses. Regardless of what the
States might have thought about each of these rights on the merits, to
tal incorporation required them to relinquish forever legislative con
trol in all of these areas, effectively putting the state legislatures in an
inferior position to Congress and the federal courts.
If, on the other hand, incorporation is not a mechanical process
but, rather, one in which the Bill of Rights informs a judgment about
what the Fourteenth Amendment protects, then no incorporation
technically occurs. On this view, the Bill of Rights is simply a source
that can illuminate the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; other
sources would include the Magna Carta, Blackstone, Coke, the Peti
tion of Right in 1627, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641, and
the common law. For example, the ratifying state legislatures might
have thought, as the Court said in Wolf, that the core notion of privacy
underlying the Fourth Amendment is protected by the Fourteenth
1 34. NELSON, supra note 132, at 1 17-23.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 218-219.
136. The meaning of Section 1 would not have to be limited to the Bill of Rights guaran
tees, of course. Senator Howard in his message when introducing the amendment to the
Senate clearly stated that it also included fundamental rights that were not protected by the
Bill of Rights, such as the right to own property. See infra text accompanying notes 239-243.
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Amendment. But unless the ratifiers thought the Bill of Rights was
mechanically incorporated, that core notion is not automatically co
extensive with the Fourth Amendment. It requires interpretation. It
requires a kind of common law or natural law account of the scope
and nature of privacy protected by due process or privileges and im
munities. Using this analytical structure, one gets a different set of an
swers to privacy questions depending on whether one is reading the
Fourteenth Amendment text or the Bill of Rights text.
The Court has refused to adopt either view of incorporation, in
stead hewing to a "selective incorporation" theory by which the Court
decides, by some mystical process, that a particular right either is in
corporated (most of them) or is not (grand jury; civil jury).137 Once
that is done, the Court treats the Fourteenth Amendment right and
the Bill of Rights right as identical protections (or at least it claims to
treat them this way). The Court has thus adopted an interpretive the
ory that features, in Justice Harlan's words, "the ease of the incorpora
tionist position, without its internal logic."138 Harlan is right on this
point. Whatever the Framers might have thought,139 it seems incon
ceivable that the ratifying state legislatures could have had selective
incorporation in mind. Not knowing which rights would be selectively
incorporated, the States would be signing a contract with its key provi
sions left blank. The States would be saying, in effect, we are hereby
surrendering as much of our sovereignty as later Supreme Courts de
cide is a good idea.140 To state the notion is to reject it. In our federal
system, the States were completely sovereign before the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution. What sovereignty they did not
surrender in those documents, as amended, the States retain.
My argument against incorporation as the preferred reading of his
tory has four parts. Despite modern fascination with Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was relatively uncontroversial and thus lit
tle explored in the debates in Congress. Most of the controversy was
about Sections 2 and 3, and even more controversy centered on black
suffrage and how or whether to admit the defeated Southern States
back into the Union. Second, only two of about 230 members of

137. For an example of how this process "works" along with a stinging critique from
Justice Harlan, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
138. Id. at 181 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. Wildenthal, who supports total incorporation, agrees that selective incorporation is
an "uneasy compromise" that is "awkward and textually untenable." Wildenthal, supra note
131, at 1055.
140. In Nelson's theory of remedial incorporation, particular rights are enforced only
against States that fail to provide that right equally to all citizens. But if the States knew this
was the meaning of Section 1, they at least knew how much sovereignty they were surren
dering - they were giving up the right to provide fundamental rights unequally.
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Congress141 took a position on incorporation during the drafting and
debates on Section 1.142 Senator Jacob Howard explicitly endorsed to
tal incorporation as the core meaning of Section 1. Representative
John Bingham was less clear but can be read the same way.143 No one
else engaged the idea, either pro or con. Third, in addition to this con
gressional silence on incorporation, no state legislator, governor, or
newspaper editorial mentioned the concept of incorporation. Fourth,
lawyers and judges were also silent on incorporation for four years af
ter ratification even though at least one Supreme Court case cried out
for that argument. When incorporation finally was mentioned in 1872,
it was in the civil context and drew the support of a single Justice
(Bradley). It was a full sixteen years after ratification before a criminal
case reached the Supreme Court arguing incorporation, and the Court
rejected the theory.144
Those who argue that the Framers meant to do more than assure
the equality of the former slaves and Union loyalists in the unfriendly
Southern States, that the Framers meant to incorporate the Bill of
Rights, thus base their entire argument on the speeches of two (of
about 230) members of Congress. They have almost no other evidence
that anyone considered the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate by
reference the Bill of Rights. They do not explain why the debates in
the state legislatures are silent, or why the newspapers did not take a
position on incorporation,1 45 or why the lawyers and judges who lived
141. JOINT COMM ON PRINTING, 100TH CONG., BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989, s. Doc. No. 100-34, at 179-82 (1989). Although there
were ultimately more than 240 members of the 39th Congress, the number at the time of the
drafting and debates on section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was somewhat smaller, due
in part to the fact that the contingent representing Tennessee was not seated until July 24,
1866. Id.
142. Amar claims that four members of Congress favored incorporation. To bring
Representative James Wilson into the fold, Amar uses a speech Wilson gave two years be
fore the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment in which he claims that the First Amend
ment already limited State power, a reading that ignores Barron. Amar, supra note 133, at
1236. That is pretty thin evidence. To bring Representative Thaddeus Stevens into the fold,
Amar relies on even shakier evidence. He reads Stevens's comment about "our
DECLARATION or organic law" to be a possible misprint. Stevens might have said "of
organic law," which, Amar asserts, would be a reference to the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. Id. After all, Stevens noted that the Constitution did not apply to the States and that
this "amendment supplies that defect." But Amar fails to quote the rest of the Stevens ' sen
tence: "amendment supplies that defect and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation
of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
all." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (emphasis in original). Stevens then
goes on to give several examples of how unjust laws would be corrected by ensuring that the
law be applied equally to black and white. This is not incorporation that Stevens urges. It is,
instead, the equality interpretation of Section 1 .
1 43. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 s t Sess. 1090-91 (1866).
1 44. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (rejecting the claim that the grand
jury requirement was included in the Fourteenth Amendment).
145. Curtis offers one example of an editorial endorsement of incorporation
The
Dubuque Daily Times, November 21, 1866. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 132. But the refer-
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through the debate and ratification were silent. Lawyers read The New
York Times in 1866. Senator Howard's speech setting out his view of
total incorporation appeared on the front page of the Times on May
24, 1866.146 The newspaper took no editorial stand on it.147 No newspa
per in the South even mentioned the theory during the contentious
ratification process.148
The incorporationist explanation of silence is that it was all so ob
vious that no one needed to mention it again. We are to assume that
politicians playing to their constituencies in New England and the
Midwest would refrain from mentioning incorporation because it had
already been mentioned twice. Moreover, how are we to explain the
silence of the state legislators? To accept the argument that of course
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, we have
to accept that all the state ratifying legislatures intended to impose on
themselves the federal Bill of Rights criminal procedure model lock, stock, and barrel - as well as the Second, Third, and Seventh
Amendments, and that they did this without comment. We must accept
that incorporation was so obviously the intent of the Framers and the
ratifying state legislatures that the newspaper editorial writers of the
time saw no need to mention it even once.
Whether total incorporation is the best understanding of the Bill of
Rights as a policy matter is one issue; whether it represented the intent
of the Framers in Congress is another. That it manifested the will of
the ratifying state legislatures is almost beyond belief. And, however
the reader resolves these issues, I simply reject out of hand the long
standing view of the academy that incorporation is obviously the best
historical understanding of what occurred between 1866 and 1868.149 It
is, at a minimum, open to serious challenge. And if it is open to serious
challenge, the reader can proceed with Parts V and VI of the Article
to consider the benefits of returning to a model in which the criminal
procedure guarantees are given an historically accurate interpretation
when applied to the federal criminal process.
Amar improves on selective incorporation by his notion of "re
fined incorporation,'' which reads Section 1 to incorporate only those
parts of the Bill of Rights that, in his view, constitute privileges or imence to "privileges rightly conferred on every citizen by the federal constitution" could be
clearer. Indeed, two sentences earlier the editorial had spoken of the "privileges and protec
tions of law . . . which nature gives."
1 46. N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1.
147. No report of any Times editorial stand on incorporation appears in the books listed
in note 132.
148. James canvasses newspaper response in the South during the ratification process,
JAMES, RATIFICATION, supra note 132, at 80-155, and makes no mention of incorporation as
a theory for interpreting Section 1.
149. See supra note 131.
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mumtles that belong to individuals (for example, the freedom of
speech) as opposed to rights that belong to the States or the public at
large (for example, the Second Amendment right to bear arms).150 If
limited to freedom of speech, Amar's refined incorporation is a plau
sible understanding of history. Congress, and even some state officials,
did express concern about protecting free speech through the Four
teenth Amendment. When Governor Jacob D. Cox introduced the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Ohio Legislature on January 2, 1867,
for example, he said that a limit on state power was
necessary long before the war, when it was notorious that any attempt to
exercise freedom of discussion in regard to the system which was then
hurrying on the rebellion, was not tolerated in the Southern States; and
the State laws gave no real protection to immunities of this kind, which
are the very essence of free government.151

However this issue is best resolved, my project is only about the
criminal procedure guarantees found in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. These provisions create rights in individuals as against
the government, and it seems likely that they would qualify for incor
poration under Amar's theory. Amar implicitly asks his reader to be
lieve that the Framers and state legislatures were clear that these
rights were to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment. As we will
see, that claim simply does not match the history.
William Nelson's theory152 matches almost all of the history but has
not received the attention that it deserves.153 Because the effect of
Nelson's reading of the history is to incorporate a right from the Bill of
Rights only against States that fail to provide that particular right
equally to all its citizens, I will refer to his theory as "remedial incor
poration." I will reserve "incorporation" for the traditional theories of
total and selective incorporation that apply to all States. The key to
Nelson's theory is to recognize that even Bingham valued state sover
eignty. In his most elaborate defense of Section 1 during the Thirty
Ninth Congress, Bingham seems to concede that States have the pri-

1 50. AMAR, supra note 1 8, at 220-23.
151. JAMES, RATIFICATION, supra note 132, at 162 (quoting CINCINNATI COM., Jan. 3,

1 867 ) .

1 52. NELSON, supra note 132, at 117-23. Though the idea is Nelson's, most of the de
fense of it that follows is mine.
153. I suspect this is because Nelson's book is about much more than just the best read
ing of Section 1. Indeed, he offers his insight on incorporation in a short discussion buried
deep within the book and does little to defend the theory. See id. at 1 17-23. Moreover, as a
serious historian, Nelson offers his theory as a way of "resolv[ing] the contradiction in the
evidence" rather than as a new historical discovery or an obvious plain meaning that others
have missed. Id. at 118. Indeed, he ultimately concludes that the historical evidence is simply
inadequate to know whether those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in
tended it to create substantive rights or simply to ensure equality in distribution of pre
existing rights. Id. at 123.

October 2001]

Constitutional Worlds Collide

187

mary responsibility to enforce "the rights of life, liberty, and prop
erty."154 And he seems to say that Section 1 would give Congress the
power to impose the "immortal bill of rights" only when States treat
citizens unequally with regard to these fundamental rights. His argu
ment is premised crucially on the notion that state legislatures never
had the authority to treat citizens unequally with regard to "life, lib
erty, and property." State officials and legislatures could treat citizens
that way only if they disregarded their oaths to uphold the Constitu
tion. He noted that those oaths "are disregarded to-day in Oregon;
they are disregarded to-day, and have been disregarded for the last
five, ten, or twenty years in every one of the deven States recently in
insurrection. "155
Bingham seems to reject the notion that Section 1 would create
new substantive rights. What was missing in the Constitution, what
Section 1 would supply, was an enforcement mechanism. Indeed, just
after the remark about States lately in insurrection, he said, "The
question is, simply, whether you will give by this amendment to the
people of the United States the power, by legislative enactment, to
punish officials of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them
by their Constitution?" If that is, as he said, the "whole question,"
then "adoption of the proposed amendment" will not take rights "that
belong to the States. They elect their Legislatures; they enact their
laws for the punishment of crimes against life, liberty, or prop
erty . . . . "156 But, Bingham cautioned, if legislators "conspire together
to enact laws refusing equal protection to life, liberty, or property,
Congress is thereby vested with power to hold them to answer before
the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths and of the
rights of their fellow-men."157
He repeats this theme near the end of the speech, noting that no
one had ever claimed that States had the authority to deny "any free
citizen" the protection of the "rights of life, liberty, and property."
Thus, those who "oppose this amendment oppose the grant of power
to enforce the bill of rights." Those who oppose the amendment "sim
ply declare to these rebel States, go on with your confiscation statutes,
your statutes of banishment, your statutes of unjust imprisonment,
your statutes of murder and death against men because of their loyalty
to the Constitution and Government of the United States."158 The next
sentence begins, "That is the issue that is before the American peo154. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
155. Id. The reference to Oregon was to a state constitution adopted in 1857 that for
bade blacks from "making contracts, holding property, or even entering the state." MALTZ,
supra note 132, at 22.
156. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1091.
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ple" and ends with a typical rhetorical flourish that he would not "be
tray this great cause."
If statutes of the type Bingham mentioned were the issue that Sec
tion 1 was intended to address, and if its function was to "punish"
States that failed to protect life, liberty, and property equally, Nelson's
remedial incorporation theory seems right. If a State refused to pro
vide freedom of speech to blacks or Union loyalists, the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the authority to enforce the First
Amendment Free Speech Clause against that particular State.159 Im
plicit in this argument is that if a State wished to ban free speech en
tirely, the Fourteenth Amendment would have nothing to say about it.
But the debate in Congress makes clear that the Fourteenth Amend
ment was limited to fundamental rights. States were not very likely to
deny fundamental rights to the rich white landowners.160 On this view,
the Fourteenth Amendment simply required the States to give the
same fundamental rights to everyone that the privileged classes en
joyed.
There are, however, a few rights in the Bill of Rights that would
not have been quite so important as the right of free speech. So, for
example, California in 1879 adopted a constitution that permitted
criminal cases to begin by information, thus rejecting the Bill of Rights
requirement of a grand jury indictment. Under remedial incorpora
tion, the question would be whether California treated all citizens
equally with regard to how the criminal process began. If California
required probable cause to begin a criminal case against whites but not
when blacks were the defendant, Congress would have the authority
to "incorporate" the grand jury requirement from the Fifth Amend
ment into the Fourteenth, but only as to California.
Remedial incorporation makes sense of all the Republican protes
tations that the Fourteenth Amendment "gave little new power to the
federal government. "161 Indeed, five of the twelve Republican mem
bers of the Joint Committee expressed federalism concerns about
Bingham's initial draft. 162 One line of Republican argument "was that
the amendment left the states free to grant or deny whatever rights
they wanted and gave the federal government power only to make cer
tain that the states distributed the rights they granted equally."163 On
this view, the "only new power that the Fourteenth Amendment
159. That Congress had the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against miscreant States
would not foreclose an appeal to the federal courts by citizens in States that were refusing to
provide fundamental rights equally.
160. See NELSON, supra note 132, at 118 (noting that the States in 1866 provided by
state law most of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights).
161. Id at 121.
162. MALTZ, supra note 132, at 94.
163. NELSON, supra note 132, at 121.
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would give to Congress and the federal courts would be to ensure that
states regulated rights reasonably, which, as Senator Edmunds ex
plained, meant 'equally and fairly.' "1 64 If the Framers instead intended
to impose all the rights in the Bill of Rights on all the States, one must
accept that these speakers were being disingenuous or dishonest when
they protested that they were not substantially eroding state sover
eignty. 1 65 How much more satisfying to be able to take the Framers at
their word that they respected state sovereignty and still find a role for
incorporation.166
Nelson is right that "[u]nderstanding section one as an instrument
for the equal rather than absolute protection of rights resolves the
contradiction in the evidence that has so puzzled historians."167 This
understanding does not, of course, explain everything. As I will dem
onstrate shortly,168 it does not explain Senator Howard's position on
incorporation. But I think the history, on balance, supports an equal
ity-based understanding of Section 1 . The debate in Congress makes
clear that the Framers neither had nor needed an exact list of pro
tected rights. They assumed Section 1 would protect fundamental
rights, in much the same way as the Civil Rights Bill,169 and thus pro
vide Congress with an additional tool to prevent the Southern States
from creating a second-class citizenship for freed slaves.170
To address the problem of discrimination against former slaves,
Section 1 first makes all the former slaves citizens of the United States
and the State in which they reside. This provision deprived States of
the power to create a de jure second-class citizenship. Section 1 then
provides three guarantees that can be read as limiting the authority of
States to discriminate on the grounds of race or loyalty to the Union,
or, presumably, any other classification for which the State lacked a
reasonable basis. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
164. Id. John Harrison offers a similar account. John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
165. NELSON, supra note 132, at 121.
166. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)). Remedial incorporation is only one mechanism for
infusing Section 1 with meaning. As Howard pointed out in his remarks, "privileges or im
munities" had a natural law meaning as well as a meaning drawn from the Bill of Rights.
Thus, quoting Justice Bushrod Washington, Howard suggested that the right to sue; to buy,
own, and sell property; and to the writ of habeas corpus were included in the meaning of
"privileges or immunities."
167. NELSON, supra note 132, at 1 18.
168. See infra notes 218-219 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
170. Many speakers also expressed concern about the treatment of Union loyalists who
returned to, or remained in, the South. In the text that follows, I will generally refer only to
the discrimination against former slaves, because that was the overarching concern, but the
reader should be aware that white Union loyalists were also the intended beneficiaries of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"
perhaps requires the legislature to "make" only facially neutral laws
and the executive to "enforce" facially neutral laws fairly.1 7 1 A State
could not, for example, enact a law that excluded blacks from serving
on juries.172 Nor could a prosecutor use peremptory challenges in a
way that achieved the same result.173
The equal protection provision might apply only to the judiciary,
limiting its application of facially neutral laws. A judge could no more
exclude blacks from serving on a jury than could the legislature.1 74
Thus, no judge, legislature, or prosecutor could keep a black citizen
from serving on a jury because of race. And the guarantee of due pro
cess assures that everyone has equal access to a fair court process gov
erned by facially neutral laws applied by judges in a neutral way.
When faced with a criminal charge, a black citizen had the same right
to jury trial, counsel, and standard of proof as did white citizens. Sec
tion 1, read this way, is a remarkably "tight" document. It guarantees
equal access to the courts and protects former slaves from discrimina
tory state laws creating privileges or immunities and arbitrary en
forcement of all existing state laws. On this view, the Fourteenth
Amendment creates no substantive rights accruing to United States citi
zens.
The Court saw the Fourteenth Amendment in this way when it be
gan to hear cases raising issues of fair treatment.175 In the most famous
of these cases, the butchers in New Orleans claimed that a state statute
deprived them of the "privilege" of practicing their profession without
171. By contrast, the modern Court finds very little work for privileges or immunities.
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
172. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (finding unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment state law excluding blacks from serving on grand and petit ju
ries). One argument against the equality view of privileges or immunities is that it duplicates
the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." But equal protection of the laws might apply
only to the application of existing laws and not to their substantive content. On this view, a
state law that permits whites, but not blacks, to own property would violate the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and not, as courts would say today, the Equal Protection Clause. The lat
ter clause would be violated if a judge took a race-neutral law and applied it unevenly (if
judges, for example, routinely granted counsel to indigent whites but not to indigent blacks).
Thus, it is possible that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant the
Equal Protection Clause to forbid unequal judicial application of existing laws, while the
Privileges or Immunities Clause limits the legislative and executive branches in their ability
to "make or enforce" laws creating fundamental privileges or immunities that discriminate
on account of race.
173. In a series of cases decided within twenty years or so of Strauder, id., the Court rec
ognized this understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court did not find a case
that proved the requisite intent until 1986 when it changed the standard by which the intent
must be proved. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
174. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), a companion case to Strauder, 100 U.S.
303, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state judges from striking
blacks from a jury on account of their race.
1 75. For an excellent account of the early cases, see NELSON, supra note 132, at 148-96.
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legislative interference. The Court rejected the claim. 1 76 But when a
black defendant in West Virginia claimed, in Strauder v. West
Virginia,177 that a state statute forbidding blacks to serve on juries vio
lated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court agreed. In explaining the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, Strauder first paraphrased the
three clauses of the second sentence in Section 1 and then explicitly
adopted an equality-based understanding of Section 1:
What is this but declaring that the law i n the States shall b e the same for
the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white,
shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the col
ored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed,
that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they
contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most
valuable to the colored race, - the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored, - exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security
of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations
which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race.11s

To assess the various positions on the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
useful to look at all sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. As other
historians have demonstrated,179 this inquiry is more than just about
historical completeness. When construing words that lack a plain
meaning, context is everything. The history of the debates and discus176. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Both Newsom and Wildenthal
have recently reinterpreted Slaughter-House to be consistent with the theory that the Four
teenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights guarantees, though not the "privilege" of
practicing the profession of being a butcher. See Newsom, supra note 131; Wildenthal, supra
note 131. While a provocative, clever argument, it is beside the point for my project. The
narrow holding of Slaughter-House sheds no meaning on the incorporation of specific provi
sions from the Bill of Rights given the Court's later holdings that the Fourteenth Amend
ment did not include the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the right to trial by
jury, or the right to a grand jury indictment (to list only criminal procedure provisions). See
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 601 (1900);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 ( 1884). The relevance of early cases is to illuminate the
contemporary understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment to help show that Twining,
Maxwell, and Hurtado (among others) were incorrectly decided. Finding a narrow holding
hidden amongst the analysis, however, does little to tell us what lawyers and judges of the
time understood. If it was so clear, why not state it? Indeed, Wildenthal cites two cases, from
the same year and same lower federal court, that do exactly that. In United States v. Hall, 26
F. Cas. 79, 82 (S.D. Ala. 1871), the court clearly stated that the first eight amendments are
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." See also United States v. Mall,
26 F. Cas. 1 147 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (limited to rights of assembly and free speech). The exis
tence of dozens of cases like these from different courts would be evidence of a contempo
rary understanding favoring incorporation. But two cases from the same court in the same
year is hardly overwhelming.
177. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
178. Id. at 307-08.
179. See supra note 132.
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sions of the Fourteenth Amendment are clear about one facet, if not
about the meaning, of Section 1. Section 1 was of "secondary impor
tance" compared to questions of "political power, particularly the
power of the rebellious southern states and of the leaders of the rebel
lion." 180 The real controversy stirred by the Amendment was about
Section 2, a precursor to the Fifteenth Amendment's requirement of
black suffrage. As James puts it, "[s]o much of the agitation and per
sonal correspondence of Radicals [Radical Republicans] in 1865 is de
voted to the suffrage issue that one cannot but believe it to have been
the center of their desires" when they approached the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment.18 1
What the country would achieve explicitly in the Fifteenth
Amendment was preceded by the Fourteenth Amendment's incentive
structure to encourage black suffrage. Section 2 subtracts from the
number of citizens counted in apportioning the House of Representa
tives all male inhabitants whose right to vote is abridged. The net ef
fect, of course, is to penalize States that did not permit blacks to vote
by reducing their representation in Congress. It was the focus of most
of the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment. Thaddeus Stevens,
Republican leader in the House, told the Congress that the most im
portant part of the Amendment was Section 2. 182 The debate on Sec
tion 2 manifested both irony and raw politics. Because former slaves
would now count as whole persons, rather that three-fifths of a person
as slaves had counted in the original Constitution, the South poten
tially would have even more political power once readmitted to the
Union than it had prior to the war. Section 2 might have been a
non-too-subtle attempt to reduce the number of House seats the
Southern States would have, on the probably safe assumption that
these States would not grant the right to vote to former slaves. 183
Section 2 was controversial not only in the South but also in the
Midwest. Only six States granted blacks the right to vote in 1866184 and
there was palpable concern in some that Section 2 portended a more
direct requirement of black suffrage, as indeed it did in the Fifteenth
Amendment. Representative Miller of Iowa expressed concern about
the hypocrisy of forcing black suffrage on the Southern States when
Iowa itself did not permit blacks to vote.185

180. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 13.
181. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 21.
182. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
183. Id. at 2798 (decrying Section 2 as "barter[ing] away human rights").
184. These States were Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. See KIRK H. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES 148-49, 166 (1918).
185. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 305 (1866).
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Section 3 prohibited Southern leaders who supported the Confed
eracy from holding federal or state office, though it permitted that dis
ability to be removed by a vote of two-thirds of each house in
Congress. Both sides criticized this provision. Radical Republicans
opposed the provision permitting removal of the disability,1 86 while the
Southern and border States thought the penalty too harsh. In North
Carolina, for example, it was considered "the strongest issue" and
some said the State should stay out of the Union rather than "exclude
[its leaders] from office." 187 A committee of the Maryland legislature
declared the provision so "repugnant to the Constitution" that it
"doubted the right of a state to ratify it."188 A Florida committee re
jected the section because "we will bear any ill before we pronounce
our own dishonor." 189
Section 4 declared valid the debts of the United States, but not
those of the Confederacy. It stirred less controversy than Sections 2
and 3, though James concludes that "at least as much attention" was
centered on it as on Section 1.190 There were complaints about this
provision in the South,191 but even there it was ultimately accepted as
the penalty for losing the war. 192 Section 5, like Section 2 of the Thir
teenth Amendment, gave Congress the authority to enforce the other
provisions by "appropriate legislation." Though this was unsurprising,
given the precedent in the Thirteenth Amendment, it precipitated
comments. The tenor of the comments, naturally, were directed at the
substantive provisions that Section 5 gave Congress the right to im
plement. The Florida governor, for example, recommended rejection
of the amendment on the ground that Section 5 together with Section
1 gave "Congress the power to legislate in all cases touching the citi
zenship, life, liberty or property of every individual in the Union, of
whatever race or color, and leave no further use for the State govern
ments. "193

186. Id. at 2544 (Stevens) ("Gentlemen tell us it is too strong - too strong for what?
Too strong for their stomachs, but not for the people. Some say it is too lenient. It is too le
nient for my hard heart. Not only to 1870 but to 18070, every rebel who shed the blood of
loyal men should be prevented from exercising any power in this Government. That, even,
would be too mild a punishment for them."); see also id. at 2536 (Eckley) ("Reject the
amendment disenfranchising rebels and you must widen the asylum in the North for those
southern people who have sympathy with the Government.").
187. JAMES, RATIFICATION, supra note 132, at 100-01.
188. Id. at 176 (paraphrasing the Maryland Senate Journal).
189. Id. at 1 1 1 (quoting the Florida House Journal).
190. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 48.
191. Id. at 94 (Georgia); id. at 1 1 1 (Florida).
192. Id. at 1 1 1 (Florida); id. at 113 (Arkansas).
193. Id. at 1 10-11 (quoting the Florida Senate Journal).
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Odd though it might seem to modern readers, even the most con
troversial parts of the Fourteenth Amendment had to compete with
more fundamental concerns. Congress had for months been consumed
with developing the right political theory of how to rebuild the Union.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction - the same Committee that
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment - operated under a charge to
"inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called
Confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any of
them, are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress." 1 94
Included in the notion of rebuilding the Union was the question of
black suffrage. The suffrage issue proved intractable in 1866, raising as
it did questions about female suffrage and whether to limit black suf
frage to the Southern States. Referring to suffrage, the Report of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction stated that it was "doubtful . . .
whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had al
ways exercised, and to which they were attached."195
But the Reconstruction Committee could not so easily dodge the
status of the defeated Southern States. Were these States still in the
Union? That, after all, had been Lincoln's theory - once joined as a
Union of States, no State could leave. But if the defeated Southern
States were still States in the Union, by what right did Congress refuse
to seat their senators and representatives? Perhaps the States of the
former confederacy had relinquished statehood by the act of rebellion
against the Union. If so, what were they? The Radical Republicans re
lied on international law norms to argue that the defeated Confeder
acy had become a territory that could be governed by Washington in
the same way the Western territories were governed.196 That theory
explained why there were no senators and representatives from these
"former States," but it did not appeal to moderate Republicans. Few
relished the prospect of the indefinite governance of that "territory"
by force of arms. Better, the moderates thought, to hobble these
States as needed to achieve freedom for the slaves and protection for
union loyalists and readmit them as States. But, on this theory, what
were the defeated States in the meantime? Were they States that had
temporarily lost their statehood, until such time that the Union States
decided to restore it? All theories offered to explain the political situa
tion of the country in 1866 were ultimately inadequate. And all raised
the ire of one side or the other.

194. BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 37 (Faculty of Political Sci. of Columbia Univ. ed., 1914); see also JAMES,
FRAMING, supra note 132, at 39.
195. JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION at XIII (1st Sess. 1866).
196. SNEED, supra note 132, at 49-83.
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Some found the Fourteenth Amendment far too modest. The
Cincinnati Commercial dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment as the
"total abandonment of the two leading ideas upon which the Radicals
started to make their fight last December: dead States and equal suf
frage."197 It is easy to forget, almost 150 years later, but the Fourteenth
Amendment was a compromise brought about by the Civil War - an
attempt, however modest, to change the political system to prevent
another war and to keep the South from continuing slavery under an
other name. The Civil War had been about preserving the Union and
the achievement of a unified, industrial, free labor economy. Freeing
the slaves was essential to the latter goal. The Thirteenth Amendment
freed the slaves, and the Fourteenth Amendment sought to protect the
Union - by hobbling the Southern States politically - and to protect
legal rights of freed slaves. Placing Section 1 in that context makes it
look different than when it is examined by itself. Perhaps it, too, was
only about equality in providing basic freedoms rather than creating
specific new federal rights immune from state abridgement.
Many voiced a concern in the Thirty-Ninth Congress that the
South was trying to reclaim a form of slavery by enacting new, and en
forcing old, laws to treat freed slaves differently from whites. Senator
Henderson put the matter this way:
The South saw its opportunity and promptly collected together all
the elements of prejudice and hatred against the negro for purposes of
future party power. They denied him the right to hold real or personal
property, excluded him from their courts as a witness, denied him the
means of education, and forced upon him unequal burdens. . . . [The
South] adopted a system of laws which doomed the negro to hopeless ig
norance, degradation, and misery. They not only denied him the ballot,
but denied him the commonest rights of human nature . . . . The only
change made was in the name: he was once a slave, and men called him a
slave; men now mocked his condition by calling him a freeman.198

A letter writer reported that while Southerners had accepted
emancipation, they did not accept the indivisibility of the Union, pre
ferring the motto "Patience, and shuffle the cards."199 Representative
at Large Sidney Clarke noted: "Every mail brings us the records of
injustice and outrage. Every gathering of the defeated yet struggling
and defiant rebels, shows conclusively that the only purpose enter
tained by them is to hold on to as much of slavery as possible."200
Representative Sidney Perham of Maine said of the former rebels:
197. JAMES, FRAMING,
1866).

supra

note 132, at 145 (quoting CINCINNATI COM., June 7,

198. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034 (1866).
199. SNEED, supra note 132, at 57.
200. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 1838 (1866) (commenting on the need for
the Civil Rights Bill).
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"Their policy is to render it so uncomfortable and hazardous for loyal
men to live among them as to compel them to leave . . . . Others have
been murdered in cold blood as a warning to all northern men who
should attempt to settle in the South."201 Senator Lot Myrick Morrill
of Maine said that "the contest for chattel slavery is over, but the
struggle for the possession of the negro as a forced laborer goes
on . . . . "202 Representative William Windom of Minnesota said that
many in the South "have demonstrated to us" by the "reenactment of
vagrant laws and slave codes for freedmen, with how much sincerity
they agreed to the abolition of slavery, and how readily that institu
tion, abolished in name, may be reestablished in fact and with in
creased cruelty."203 The feeling about Southern intransigence was per
haps most cogently put by General Oliver Otis Howard, head of the
Freedmen's Bureau, who said that Southerners "surrender slavery
inch by inch and piece by piece."204
The manifest concern among the Framers was to compel the South
to provide equal treatment for freed slaves and others who were not in
favor in the war's aftermath. Prior to considering the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Thirty-Ninth Congress had debated and passed a
Civil Rights Bill, its protections specifically tailored to protect equal
ity. It guaranteed citizens of the United States
of every race and color . . . the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citi
zens.205

Many in Congress expressed concern over whether the Civil Rights
Bill was constitutional,206 and President Johnson questioned its consti
tutionality when vetoing it.207 That concern was sometimes offered as a
reason to pass the Fourteenth Amendment despite the claim of some
that it was unnecessary in light of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Civil Rights Bill, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article
IV.208 To the extent there was doubt that Congress had the authority
to legislate equality under the Civil Rights Bill, a Fourteenth Amend
ment that protected equality would be the easy solution. And, as we
201. Id. at 2082.
202. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 155 (1866).
203. Id. at 3170.
204. Id. at 1838 (quoted by Sidney Clarke).
205. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
206. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 89-90.
207. Id. at 97-99.
208. SNEED, supra note 132, at 173-81.
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will see, both the proponents and opponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment during the ratification process, at least in the South, used
the Civil Rights Bill as a proxy for what Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment protected.209
The discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress was
dominated by concern about creating equality under the law.
Representative Henry Jarvis Raymond of New York noted his support
for the Fourteenth Amendment as a way of "secur[ing] an equality of
rights among all the citizens of the United States."210 Windom of
Maine complained that the Fourteenth Amendment did not go far
enough because it did not include "political as well as civil equality
among its guarantees. "211 Senator Henderson said, "Within the scope
of State j urisdiction [in the South] there is no such thing as equality in
law."212 Thaddeus Stevens, the Republican leader noted when pre
senting the Fourteenth Amendment to the House that Section 1 "al
lows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that
the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
,,
all. 213
As an example of how the equality view of the Fourteenth
Amendment would work, consider what the Framers had to say about
freedom of speech and of the press.214 The history is replete with ref
erences to the need to protect free speech and free assembly in the
South.215 A colorful example was Representative Price's observation
that "if a citizen of a free State visiting a slave State expressed his
opinion in reference to slavery he was treated without much ceremony
to a coat of tar and feathers and a ride upon the rail. "216 Curtis con
cludes that "[d)enial of First Amendment rights [by the Southern
States) was a recurring theme" of the election of 1866.217 But all that
was necessary to protect First Amendment rights was to ensure that
the rights of the freed slaves and loyalists were protected the same

209. See infra notes 250-259 and accompanying text.
210. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866).
211. Id. at 3169.
212. Id. at 3035.
213. Id. at 2459.
214. See Crosskey, supra note 130, at 33.
215. In Curtis's fascinating account of speeches, newspaper accounts, and reports from
the election of 1866, covering fifteen pages, there is a single reference to problems in the
criminal systems and dozens of references to deprivation of First Amendment freedoms.
CURTIS, supra note 131, at 131-145.
216. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1866). The remarks referenced the time
before slavery was abolished, but the speaker makes clear that nothing had changed in re
gard to free speech in the South.
217. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 138.

198

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:145

way as those of the white political majorities. Perhaps that is all that
the Framers intended Section 1 to do.
There is one more piece of evidence that the Framers did not in
tend to incorporate the Bill of Rights so that it applied to all States.
While it is true that Bingham and Jacob Howard articulated an incor
poration theory when explaining Section 1 , what escapes notice is the
lack of effect these remarks had on the rest of the debate in Congress
and among the States. As we saw, Bingham spoke at length in the
House about the need to impose the Bill of Rights on States that en
acted laws creating inequality in fundamental rights. Senator Jacob
Howard's remarks on May 23, 1866, when he defined "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" were even clearer. These
privileges and immunities include certain natural law rights, according
to Howard, and also "the personal rights guarantied and secured by
the first eight amendments of the Constitution."218 Moreover, after
noting that Congress lacked the authority to enforce the Bill of Rights
against the States, Howard said, "[t]he great object of the first section
of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States
and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guar
antees. "219
It is difficult to be much clearer than that, though if application to
all the States as a routine matter were the widely shared goal, one
wonders why the clause was not drafted to say that - "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights created in the
first eight Amendments to this Constitution, or any other privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."220 That phrasing is pretty easy to invent; it took me about five
minutes. What seems at first glance odd about the debate after
Howard's remarks, however, is that his clear-headed interpretation
seems to have had no effect. At least two members of the Senate who

218. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
219. Id. at 2766.
220. My proposed language is a rejoinder to Curtis, who argues that the drafters made
no specific mention of the Bill of Rights because they wanted to protect a more inclusive set
of liberties. CURTIS, supra note 131 , at 125. My language does both. Amar argues that the
language of the Amendment is "exactly what one would expect if incorporation were a goal
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Amar, supra note 133, at 1 220. But Dripps gets the better
of Amar here, asserting that it
would be equally fair to say that the text is exactly what one would expect if protecting sex
ual privacy. or freedom of contract, or the right to grow marijuana were a goal of the Four
teenth Amendment. To say that the text is consistent with incorporation is uninteresting, be
cause the text is consistent with almost anything.
Dripps, supra note 17, at 1576. My proposed language in the text is, instead, "exactly what
one would expect if incorporation were a goal of the Fourteenth Amendment."
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spoke in later sessions expressed their lack of understanding of
"privileges or immunities," one of them during a colloquy with
Howard himself and one a moment later.221 Yet no one mentioned
Howard's elegant theory or offered an incorporationist response to the
challenge to define "privileges or immunities." Howard himself did
not reference his theory of incorporation when challenged to define
privileges or immunities. It is not that there was argument about what
Howard had said. It was as if he had not said the words at all.
Almost all of the debate that followed Howard's speech was about
adding a new sentence to Section 1
the current first sentence that
defines citizenship. It caused great debate over whether it granted citi
zenship to Chinese persons and to Indians.222 But no one engaged
Senator Howard's theory of incorporation. Is this a "dog that didn't
bark,"223 suggesting that, at least in Congress, the idea of incorporation
was so noncontroversial and so obvious that it simply did not need to
be repeated? Curtis argues that everyone already understood that full
incorporation was the Republican position, and it was unnecessary to
say it more than twice. Amar claims that the clarity of Howard's and
Bingham's remarks, combined with their prominent roles in the crea
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, makes the silence into evidence in
favor of incorporation. In Amar's words: "Surely, if the words of Sec
tion 1 meant something different, here was the time to stand up and
say so."224 Perhaps. B ut it remains intriguing that when questions were
raised about the meaning of "privileges or immunities," no one re
sponded by citing the speeches of Howard or Bingham. One explana
tion is that those who raised the questions were opponents of the
Amendment, and Republicans simply kept their counsel because they
saw the question as political rhetoric. But missing here is why oppo
nents of the Amendment did not adopt the incorporation theory and
-

221. In response to Senator Howard's attempt to explain why he used "abridge" in con
nection with "privileges or immunities," Senator Hendricks said "I have not heard any Sena
tor accurately define, what are the rights and immunities of citizenship; and I do not know
that any statesman has very accurately defined them." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
3039 (1866). No one responded to the challenge. One speaker later, Senator Johnson said
that the "privileges or immunities" clause was objectionable "simply because I do not under
stand what will be the effect of that." Id. at 3041. No one responded. In addition, Senator
Yates complained about "tortuous and hard-to-be-understood propositions," presumably in
reference to Section 1. Id. at 3037.
222. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 1088 (1866) (Woodbridge); id. at
1095 (Hotchkiss); id. at 2510 (Miller); id. at 2890 (Howard); id. at 2890-91 (Cowan); id. at
2892 (Doolittle); id. at 2893 (Fessenden); id. (Trumbull); id. (Johnson); id. (Wade); id. at
2894 (Van Winkle); id. at 2895 (Hendricks); id. (Clarke); id. (Clarke); id. at 2986 (Fessenden,
Howard, Doolittle, Grimes); id. at 2897 (Williams, Saulsbury).
223. The reference is to a Sherlock Holmes story in which Holmes solved the mystery by
noting that the dog didn't bark when he should have (and thus knew the person who com
mitted the crime). A. CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES
383, 400 (1938).
224. Amar, supra note 133, at 1238.
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use it against the Amendment. The more restrictions to be placed on
state government, the stronger the argument that state sovereignty
was being eroded too severely. But no one - no supporter, no oppo
nent - said anything to engage Bingham's or Howard's incorporation
theory.
One reason for the failure to engage the incorporation question is
that, as we have seen, members of Congress were more concerned
about other sections of the Amendment as well as more fundamental
issues that had to do with the structure of government. Was there still
time to amend the bill to provide for black suffrage? Should passage
of the Amendment be a condition for readmission of the States of the
former confederacy? If so, should these States be told that ratification
guaranteed readmission? Perhaps passage was insufficient to secure
readmission (this was the Radical position). These were weighty mat
ters: the Union still literally hung in the balance.
Drawing on newspaper accounts, James reports that when Howard
rose to speak, "Very little interest could be detected among the sena
tors. As one observer wrote, 'A lethargy more alarming than high ex
citement is generally visible.' "225 Howard had a speaking style that
was "somewhat ponderous,"226 and the speech lasted two hours.227 His
approach to issues in general "appealed to reason rather than to the
emotions"228 and perhaps the speech did not play well with the audi
ence.229 Though a member of the Reconstruction Committee, Howard
had not been a major figure in the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and he reported the Amendment to the Senate only be
cause William Fessenden of Maine was ill that day.230 Howard "was
noted for his radicalism,"231 and had repeatedly voted against
Bingham's language protecting privileges and immunities, due process,
and equal protection. A late draft in Committee had Bingham's lan
guage as Section 5 with a Section 1 that said, "No discrimination shall
be made by any State nor by the United States as to the civil rights of
persons because of race, color or previous condition of servitude. "232
On a motion in committee to strike Section 5, Howard voted yes and it
225. JAMES. FRAMING, supra note 1 32, at 135 (quoting THE N.Y. HERALD, May 24,
1866). James' citation is to the May 21, 1866, edition of the Herald, but this must be a mis
print as Howard's speech did not occur until May 23.
226. 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 278 (Dumas Malone, ed. 1932).
227. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 135 (citing THE N.Y. HERALD, May 24, 1866).
228. DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 226, at 278.
229. Some of the newspapers, however, were paying attention. The part of Howard's
speech discussing privileges and immunities was quoted verbatim on the front page of the
next day's New York Times. N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1 .
230. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, a t 135.
231. Id. at 45.
232. KENDRICK, supra note 1 94, at 90-91.
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passed, seven to five.233 This left only the civil rights provision. After
much parliamentary maneuvering, and undoubtedly much off-stage
politicking, Bingham moved a few days later to amend by substituting
his language for Section 1, thus eliminating the civil rights provision.234
This motion passed with Howard one of three members voting no.235
Thus, rather than an Amendment with both a civil rights provision and
Bingham's provision, the Committee reported an Amendment with
only Bingham's language.
Perhaps Howard voted against Bingham's language as a substitute
for the civil rights provision because Howard's goal was to prohibit ra
cial discrimination and he doubted whether Bingham's vague language
would achieve that goal.236 When Howard lost that vote, he presuma
bly sought to give a broad construction to Bingham's language to
achieve as much protection as possible against racial discrimination.
The goal of forbidding racial discrimination, so clearly held by almost
all Republicans in Congress, provides the key for why the debate fo
cused on equality rather than incorporation. This brings us back, of
course, to Nelson's theory of remedial incorporation - permit
Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights guarantees against any State
that did not provide basic rights equally to blacks and all whites. The
real prize was equality and that was what Congress intended Section 1
to achieve.237
Opponents viewed Section 1 as a guarantee of equality. Represen
tative Andrew Rogers of New Jersey, speaking in opposition to the
Amendment, summarized one natural law effect of Section 1. He
pointed out that in Kentucky, the law proscribed the penalty of death
for a black man, but not a white man, who raped a white woman; in
Indiana, blacks were forbidden to own property; Pennsylvania had
segregated schools. Rogers believed that the effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be to compel Kentucky "to inflict the same pun
ishment upon a white man for rape as a black man," to "abrogate and
blot out" the Indiana law about property ownership, and to compel
Pennsylvania "to provide for white children and black children to at
tend the same school"238 Rogers thus understood the Amendment to
require each State to give black citizens the same fundamental rights
as it created for white citizens.

233. Id. at 98.
234. Id. at 106.
235. Id.
236. MALTZ, supra note 132, at 91-92.
237. See, e.g., SNEED, supra note 132, at 330-31 (quoting Stevens); id. at 350 (quoting
Eliot); id. at 350 (noting that Miller "linked the spirit of Section 1 to the Declaration of In
dependence.")
238. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 134 (1866).
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As Howard made clear, these rights were broader than the rights
in the Bill of Rights. They were the "principles lying at the very foun
dation of all republican government,"239 including the right to hold
land; the right to collect wages by legal process; the right to sue, the
right to testify;240 the right to hold real and personal property, to be
confronted by witnesses, to have the process of the courts, to hold real
or personal property, to testify, to have an education, and not to be
given "unequal burdens";24 1 to marry, to vote, to contract, to be a ju
ror.242 Historian Joseph James concludes that "judicial minds in the
Senate understood as fundamental rights" those mentioned in the sev
enth section of the Freedman's Bureau Bill: "the right to make and en
force contracts; to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit, pur
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property; and to
have full and equal benefit of personal right guarantees in the laws
and constitutions of the several states."243 Incorporation was, of
course, irrelevant to these concerns. Indeed, most of the Bill of Rights
guarantees were quite beside the point in addressing the problems of
the Black Codes and wholesale discrimination against blacks and
Union loyalists.
Now we have a pretty good account of why no one spoke of incor
poration other than Bingham and Howard. It was partly that Congress
faced other, more fundamental problems that, being political in na
ture, they understood better than the delicate task of explaining
Bingham's vague language in Section 1. It was partly that incorpora
tion did not address most of the pressing problems in the States of the
former confederacy. It was partly that Congress might have under
stood Section 1 to authorize enforcement of the Bill of Rights only
against States that failed to provide those rights to all citizens equally.
Those States would be largely, perhaps exclusively, the defeated
Southern States that had no representatives in Congress. Even the
Democrats from the border States were probably unwilling to argue
that States should not provide freedom of speech and other funda
mental rights equally to all.
If Nelson's reading of the history is correct, no one objected to in
corporation as an erosion of state sovereignty because it did not erode
the sovereignty of States that treated their citizens fairly. Moreover,
there would be no reason for supporters of the Amendment to refer to
incorporation when questions arose about the meaning of Section 1.
Incorporation was simply one mechanism by which miscreant States
239. Id. at 2961.
240. Id. at app. 219.
241. Id. at 3034-35 (Henderson).
242. Id. at 2538 (Rogers).
243. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 76.
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could be brought into line. The goal was equality in the provision of
fundamental rights and that was the tenor of the explanations the sup
porters offered the skeptics.
Even if Nelson's reading of the history is incorrect, we are still left
with a pretty clear picture of why incorporation provoked silence
rather than discussion among the Framers. Reading the entire debate
in the Congressional Globe discloses that Howard's and Bingham's
comments are lost in a sea of concern about ensuring that States treat
blacks and Union loyalists fairly. Looming over everything was the
realpolitik of how to deal with the Southern States and keep the Union
intact. Moreover, there was an election coming up in the fall, and the
Republicans wanted a campaign issue to use against President
Johnson and the Democrats. It was critical to Republican hopes for
achieving equality to maintain a veto-proof majority in both Houses of
Congress.244 Thus, they could not linger over nice judicial questions
about privileges or immunities, due process, or equal protection.
That the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment no longer trusted
state legislatures and j udges as completely as did the Framers of the
Bill of Rights cannot be questioned. The whole point to the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments was to restrict the power of States to
abridge rights; the debate, of course, is to what extent state power was
to be restricted. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had lost
confidence in at least the Southern legal processes to treat blacks and
whites equally. Had the Framers also lost confidence in the ability of
state legislatures to set fair rules to conduct criminal proceedings? Did
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment have the same distrust of
state legislatures and judges in the context of the criminal process that
the earlier Framers had of Congress and the federal judiciary? In a
word, the historical answer is no. Nelson provides a somewhat more
nuanced answer: Congress was willing to enforce the Bill of Rights on
States that proved they could not be trusted.
Though evidence shows that the South used the criminal process to
provide unfair treatment to Union loyalists and freed slaves,245 the
problem was not that people lacked rights against the state (to jury
trial, to counsel, to a fair process). Rather, the problem was that the
state authorities were not giving the former slaves and loyalists the
rights of other defendants. In some cases, according to Representative
Sidney Perham of Maine, the state officers were "intimidated by
threats of violence, and brutally murdered for a faithful discharge of
duty."246 But whether the problem was that the officers and prosecu
tors were complicit or intimidated, a sufficient remedy was to require
244. See MALTZ, supra note 132, at 79.
245. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 135-36.
246. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2082 (1866).
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the States to provide the same fundamental rights to loyalists and
freed slaves as to others. Again, this evidence is consistent with
Nelson's notion that Section 1 simply sought to encourage States to
protect the rights of blacks by threatening to impose the federal Bill of
Rights on those that refused.
Whatever the intent of the Framers, most scholars focus exces
sively, sometimes exclusively, on that issue. They do not take sufficient
account of the intent of the ratifying legislatures. If the state legisla
tures did not understand that the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo
rated the Bill of Rights, then it is difficult to know how they could
have ceded that sovereignty. As I sought to demonstrate earlier,247 un
der the basic federalist structure of the Constitution, the States only
ceded as much sovereignty to the federal government in the Four
teenth Amendment as they intended to cede. The incorporationists
argue here that the States could infer limitations on their criminal pro
cesses from the language of Section 1. The contrary argument is that
the generality of the language of Section 1, considered in light of the
centuries-old tradition that States design their own criminal systems,
did not put the States on notice that the Fourteenth Amendment
would affect their criminal processes. Lacking textual notice of a limit
on that category of state power, the only way the States could have in
tended to cede sovereignty in that category was by virtue of a general
understanding that this is what Section 1 accomplished.
Deciding what was generally understood requires deciding how
controversial it would have been for the States to adopt the criminal
procedure guarantees by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.
Crosskey and Amar assume that the States considered the Bill of
Rights noncontroversial. Fairman makes the opposite assumption. The
reason this matters, of course, is that there is no contemporary evi
dence (in the press or in the debates in the state legislatures) that any
one even talked about specific criminal procedure guarantees in the
Bill of Rights.248 If incorporation of the criminal procedure guarantees
would not have been controversial, this might explain the total silence.
But if the idea of changing all thirty-seven State criminal processes to
conform to the federal model would have been controversial, the si
lence is deafening.
The silence during the ratification debates about incorporating the
criminal procedure rights was total. Joseph James's study of the news
papers and state legislative proceedings of the period from 1866 to
1868 discloses not a single reference, either pro or con, to the notion
that the Fourteenth Amendment would apply the criminal procedure
247. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
248. There is a bit of evidence relating to free speech. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 132,
at 162. Of course, that evidence is also consistent with Nelson's remedial incorporation the
ory.
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Bill of Rights guarantees to the States. In James Bond's similar study
limited to the Southern States, the silence is equally total. Many objec
tions were lodged against the Amendment, which initially failed to se
cure the necessary number of States for ratification, and many impas
sioned speeches and newspaper articles supported the idea that the
Amendment drastically limited state power. But no one mentioned in
corporation of the criminal procedure guarantees into the Fourteenth
Amendment or discussed any of those guarantees as a potential limita
tion on state criminal processes.
After a study of all the original records in the eleven States that
formed the confederacy, Bond concludes that "no one [in the South]
believed that Section 1 incorporated the Bill of Rights."249 Instead,
Bond documents that in State after State, the provisions of Section 1
were understood as incorporating the equality-guaranteeing provi
sions of the Civil Rights Bill. In North Carolina, the proponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment downplayed fears that it would change the
organic character of our federal system. They assured North Carolini
ans that Section 1 "included only those rights enumerated in the Civil
Rights Bill: the rights to contract, sue, and hold property. "250 Oppo
nents in North Carolina used the same arguments against Section 1
that they had used against the Civil Rights Bill, "implicitly con
firm[ing] the view that Section 1 merely transformed the statutory
provisions of the Civil Rights Bill into constitutional law."25 1 The New
Orleans Tribune, "the only Radical Republican voice" in Louisiana
during Reconstruction,252 published on June 16, 1866, a long explana
tion of Section 1; it emphasized that the Amendment outlawed dis
crimination on the basis of race or origin and thus gave the Civil
Rights Bill a constitutional footing.253 A pro-suffrage paper published
in Alabama lamented that the Fourteenth Amendment was too much
like the Civil Rights Bill, concerned only with equality in the area of
civil rights.254
A Virginia newspaper opposed to ratification said that Section 1
"is the 'Civil Rights Bill.' "255 Georgia newspapers explained that the
Fourteenth Amendment would make "the negro" the equal of the
white man, would guarantee the "civil rights and privileges of the per
son in all parts of the Republic," and would reaffirm "the chief provi-

249. BOND, supra note 132, at 10.
250. Id. at 57.
251. Id. at 56.
252. Id. at 75.
253. Id. at 80-81 .
254. Id. a t 106.
255. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
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sions of the civil rights bill."256 In an address to voters in Mississippi on
October 13, 1869, A.R. Johnston "denounced" the Radical Republi
cans "and all their Reconstruction plans."257 But in a gesture to prag
matism, Johnston told the voters he was prepared to accept Recon
struction. "He then promised the black members of the audience
speedy ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. He
pledged that blacks would 'be the equal before the law with the white
race, the right to vote, serve on juries, give evidence in court, sue for
and get all property rights.' "258 The pro-ratification governor of
Tennessee explained that Section 1 guaranteed "equal protection in
the enjoyment of life, liberty, property . . . to all citizens. Practically,
this affects mainly the negro . . . [making him] entitled to the civil
rights of the citizen, and to the means of enforcing those rights."259
Governor Thomas C. Fletcher of Missouri said of Section 1 , " [i]t
prevents a State from depriving any citizen of the United States any of
the rights conferred on him by the laws of Congress, and secures to all
persons equality of protection in life, liberty, and property under the
laws of the State."260 Notice that Governor Fletcher saw the Four
teenth Amendment as protecting against state infringement rights be
stowed by Congress but did not mention any other national rights. The
second clause, of course, returns to the familiar theme that States had
to provide equality of treatment under state law to all persons. We
earlier saw Governor Cox's concern about freedom of speech,261 which
was echoed by others - most colorfully by Representative Mann of
Pennsylvania who noted that whoever "went down South was obliged
to put a padlock on his mouth."262
And what of the argument that "everyone knew" that the Four
teenth Amendment also incorporated the Bill of Rights guarantees?
That universal knowledge failed to make it as far as Mississippi.
Mississippi did not ratify the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
until 1870. Thus, the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment that
took place during 1869 had the advantage of the debates in the other
States. During this period Governor James Alcorn blamed the soaring
crime rates on the "barbarous practice" of carrying guns and knives,

256. Id. at 234.
257. Id. at 44.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 21.
260. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 146.
261. See supra text accompanying note 151.
262. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 148; see also id. at 148-49 (quoting Representative
M'Camant, also of Pennsylvania).
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"which was almost universal among both races in the South."263 Bond
writes:
[Alcorn] therefore asked the legislature to adopt laws that restricted the
right to carry arms. It never occurred to the governor to explain why the
Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent such laws, as it arguably might
have, had the Second Amendment been incorporated in Section 1. After
all, the Second Amendment guarantees the right to bear arms. Oppo
nents of the proposed laws never relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's
"incorporated" right to bear arms either. All seemed blissfully ignorant
of an argument that certainly would be made by incorporationists to
day.264

We can learn something from the opponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the South. They "repeatedly stressed the dangers of
giving Congress" the "power to define and therefore expand the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, which states were obliged to
respect."265 The opponents "routinely paraded the horrid possibili
ties": the "right of blacks to vote, followed by miscegenation, mixed
schools, and integrated saloons and railway cars." Bond concludes:
"Alert as the opponents were to the danger of federal power, they
never once mentioned that it included the power to enforce the Bill of
Rights against the states."266 Based on his study of the contemporary
record in the Southern States, Bond concludes, "The evidence that
Section 1 was understood to protect natural rights is overwhelm
ing. . . . The evidence is equally overwhelming that the privileges and
immunities clause was also understood to include those civil rights
which persons needed in order to protect and exercise their natural
rights."267
To be sure, there was a concern about federal intrusion into state
criminal processes, but it was not articulated in terms of incorporation.
Consider a letter from Orville H. Browning, President Johnson's
Secretary of the Interior, that was widely circulated during the elec
tions of 1866. Browning said in part:
If the proposed amendments of the Constitution be adopted, new and
enormous power will be claimed and exercised by Congress, as war
ranted by such amendments, and the whole structure of our Government
will perhaps gradually but yet surely be revolutionized. And so with the
Judiciary . . . . The object and purpose [of the Amendment] are manifest.
It is to subordinate the State judiciaries in all things to Federal supervi
sion and control; to totally annihilate the independence and sovereignty
of State judiciaries in the administration of State laws, and the authority
263. BOND, supra note 132, at 45.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 255.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 256-57.
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and control of the States over matters of purely domestic and legal con
cern. 268

Browning clearly thought that subjugation of state judiciaries to
the federal courts was an issue that would draw votes away from the
Radical Republicans. One of Browning's examples of how the federal
judiciary would "annihilate" the state judiciaries involves criminal law:
[I] f a murderer be arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to be hung, he
may claim the protection of the new constitutional provision, allege that
a State is about to deprive him of life without due process of law, and ar
rest all further proceedings until the Federal Government shall have in
quired [into the case] .269

This concern about federal power, limited to how the courts might use
the vague Due Process Clause to insist on the right to review state
criminal proceedings, would likely be multiplied if anyone thought
that the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would be imposed for
ever on state legislatures and courts.
Browning's parade of horribles, including his example about the
annihilation of state criminal processes, did not mention incorpora
tion. The entire lengthy letter, written after Bingham and Howard en
dorsed incorporation in Congress, contains no reference to the Bill of
Rights as a whole or to any specific right that might be carried into the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does it mention any example that might
imply incorporation of any part of the Bill of Rights. This omission is
even more significant when one recalls that Browning opposed the
Fourteenth Amendment. If Browning had thought incorporation was
a theory to be taken seriously, or perhaps had he and President
Johnson even thought about it at all, he would surely have raised that
as an even more draconian invasion of "the authority and control of
the States over matters of purely domestic and legal concern."
Moreover, as Maltz points out, the proponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment failed to make any reference to incorporation. Calling
this the "most puzzling anomaly for incorporationists," Maltz notes
that "Republicans were not shy in pointing to the Civil Rights Act as a
primary source for section one; presumably, an added appeal to the
Bill of Rights would have had an even stronger, visceral impact."270
The absolute silence of proponents and opponents during the ratifica
tion process severely undermines the argument that the state legisla
tures intended to ratify a Fourteenth Amendment that incorporated
the Bill of Rights in any way other than as a penalty for failing to pro
vide fundamental rights to all citizens.

268. CINCINNATI COM., October 26, 1866, at 2.
269. Id.
270. MALTZ, supra note 132, at 1 1 7.
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If equality was thought the principal goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and if Nelson is right that the federal Bill of Rights
would be applied only to States that misbehaved, it explains how ten
of the ratifying States could vote to impose the Fourteenth Amend
ment on themselves even though they already had or were considering
grand jury rules that were less comprehensive than the one in the Fifth
Amendment.27 1 If the States thought that the Fourteenth Amendment
required a fair criminal process applied equally to blacks and whites,
then we can understand how those ten States might vote for the
Amendment without concern. Otherwise, we have to believe that
those States agreed to reform their criminal processes by voting to im
pose the Fifth Amendment grand jury indictment requirement on
themselves through the Fourteenth Amendment without any discus
sion of whether this was a good idea.272
Curtis argues that the ratifying state legislatures, controlled by Re
publicans, had their eye on the bigger prize - equality to freed slaves
and the threat of reduced representation for States that did not permit
former slaves to vote.273 Although they did not see the inconsistency
with their own laws and the Bill of Rights' guarantees, Curtis dismisses
that failure as simply the product of inattention at a time when the
stakes were high and the very Union was still unstable. Amar agrees,
concluding that "many informed men simply were not thinking care
fully about the words of Section One at all."274 I agree so far. But the
next step is shaky indeed: because the legislatures were inattentive to
the meaning of Section 1, Amar argues that their silence "is a dubious
key to unlocking the meaning of Section One."275 This is positively
perverse. Unless the text on its face incorporates the Bill of Rights,
how can the inattention of the legislatures be anything other than evi
dence against incorporation? How can a State ratify something with
out knowing that it is doing so? As Curtis correctly notes, "The great
controversy is how to take the absence of evidence."276 To me, inatten
tion as to the meaning of Section 1 suggests that one should reject
more elaborate interpretations - privileges or immunities as a silent
mechanism to overrule Barron - in favor of the simpler interpreta
tion that Fourteenth Amendment means what it says - that it guaran
teed that all citizens had equal access to natural law privileges and
271 . AMAR, supra note 18, at 198.
272. Maltz claims that a concern with conflicting state grand jury procedures would have
been lost in Congress amidst the larger Reconstruction concerns. MALTZ, supra note 132, at
1 16-17. That seems right. But it is less clear to me that the States would have found the pros
pect of being forced into the federal model of criminal procedure a trivial prospect.
273. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 105.
274. Amar, supra note 133, at 1250.
275. Id.
276. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 217.
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immunities and to fair court procedures, and that the laws be applied
equally.
The suggestion that the States intended to forfeit their right to
conduct criminal trials the way they and their colonial antecedents had
been doing for over 200 years ignores human nature and the still
strong (though diminished) sense of state sovereignty that existed in
1868. It was not that the States found the Bill of Rights guarantees ab
horrent. The States provided most of these rights, in one form or an
other, as a matter of state law.277 The sea change would be making the
state criminal processes both uniform and subject to federal control.
Criminal law, with very few exceptions in 1868, was thought to be ex
clusively the province of the States, and the state systems differed
from one another to some degree. The state systems and their colonial
antecedents pre-dated the Bill of Rights by more than 150 years. The
Bill of Rights was largely copied from pre-existing state law to control
the feared central government. To have those limitations turned back
against the States to create a uniform criminal process in all the States
would have been viewed as ironic at best and perverse at worst.
The silence on this issue continued in the aftermath of ratification.
States continued to adopt rules that were inconsistent with the Bill of
Rights. The California Constitution, adopted in 1879, permitted a
prosecutor's information to be substituted for an indictment. If it had
been generally believed that the Fourteenth Amendment made the
Fifth Amendment grand jury rule applicable to all States, what was
California thinking when it adopted its Constitution? Moreover, nei
ther the Supreme Court of that era, nor the litigants who appeared be
fore the Court, were aware that the Fourteenth Amendment had over
ruled Barron v. Baltimore's holding that the Bill of Rights did not bind
the States. Despite the clarity of Senator Howard's remarks, the law
yers who represented criminal defendants before the Court did not
make incorporation arguments, and the Court did not contemplate the
availability of the criminal procedure guarantees in state cases. Given
the duty of criminal defense lawyers to raise every conceivable argu
ment on behalf of their clients, this silence speaks volumes about the
general understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Twitchell v. Commonwealth278 was decided a year after the Four
teenth Amendment's ratification. The Supreme Court heard an emer
gency writ of habeas corpus from a condemned state prisoner, sched
uled to hang six days later, who claimed that the state indictment did
not provide sufficient notice of the charge. He claimed a violation of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and, more particularly, a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to be "informed of the nature
277. NELSON, supra note 132, at 118.
278. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869).
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and cause of the accusation." If the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo
rated the Sixth Amendment, the Court should have reached the merits
of the claim. Instead, the Court unanimously reaffirmed Barron and
rejected the writ without reaching the merits.
If Senator Howard's view of the Fourteenth Amendment was gen
erally thought to express the view of Congress and of the ratifying
state legislatures, it is puzzling that it escaped the attention of all nine
Supreme Court justices who decided Twitchell. Amar attempts to ex
plain Twitchell as incompetent lawyering and judging. He notes that
Twitchell's lawyer raised the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
and Sixth Amendment right to notice without arguing that these rights
were applicable against the States through the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Without the Fourteenth Amendment before the Court, Amar
argues, there was no ground on which to overrule Barron.279 Thus, the
Court reaffirmed Barron, and Twitchell was off to the gallows.
Amar's explanation suffers several problems.280 I will mention only
one. All members of the Twitchell Court were on the Court during the
debates, congressional passage, and state ratification of the Four
teenth Amendment281 - events which attracted much publicity na
tionwide and surely even more in Washington, D.C.282 Amar's view
requires that we believe either that the Court simply did not know
what was clear to Congress and the ratifying state legislatures, or that
the Court knew that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill
of Rights but chose not to raise this constitutional objection to
Twitchell's execution. The first possibility requires us to accept that
not a single Supreme Court justice of the time comprehended what is
now patently clear. That level of incompetence is too profound to be
accepted.
Alternatively, if the Court was aware of the argument, it would be
extremely casuistic to refuse to reach the merits of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights contained in the Fourteenth Amendment simply
because the lawyer asked for the rights directly rather than as incorpo
rated in the Fourteenth Amendment. This was a case, after all, in
which the Court had granted an emergency hearing and full oral ar
gument to a defendant sentenced to hang a few days later. It makes no
sense for the Court to hide the ball from the defense lawyer in that
kind of case. One imagines the members of the Court smirking to each
other behind a copy of the Constitution while sending a man to be
279. Amar, supra note 133, at 1255.
280. Dripps presents a more detailed rebuttal. Dripps, supra note 17, at 1579-82.
281 . Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase took the oath on December 15, 1864, and the next
new Justice, Justice William Strong, did not take his oath until March 14, 1870.
282. Most major newspapers carried a "Washington News" kind of summary of the con
gressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment as well as other subjects. See, e.g., N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1866.
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hanged. If everyone knew that the Fourteenth Amendment had incor
porated the Bill of Rights, the Court might as well engage that under
standing in Twitchell and be done with it. But the Court said nothing
except that Barron was still good law in the wake of the Fourteenth
Amendment.283
A convenient way to assess how the Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment in the early years is a study done by Charles Collins, a
1912 historian, that purports to include every Supreme Court case on
the Fourteenth Amendment through the 1910-11 term, a total of 604
cases.284 Collins cites a litany of natural law rights that litigants urged
on the Supreme Court. I quote part of a list he provided (these are all
Supreme Court cases):
Suit to recover the value of a dog in Louisiana on which no tax had been
paid; . . . the sale of cigarettes in Tennessee; . . . the question whether a
convicted murderer in Idaho should be hanged by the sheriff or by the
warden; . . . the compelling of railroads in Texas to cut the Johnson grass
off from their rights of way before it goes to seed; . . . the segregation of
houses of ill fame in New Orleans; the question whether running a bar
ber shop on Sunday in Minnesota is a work of necessity or the practice of
a handicraft for gain . . .285
.

Of the 604 cases in the study, only fifty-five were decided against the
state.286 In twenty-one of the fifty-five cases, the claimant also invoked
another provision in the Constitution, often the Commerce Clause.287
Many of the cases in which the Supreme Court found a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment involved regulation of business activities or
taxation issues.288
A State lost only one criminal procedure case. The Court held in
1879 that a West Virginia statute that explicitly excluded blacks from
serving on grand and petit juries violated the Fourteenth Amend
ment.289 This, of course, is precisely the interpretation of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment that I proposed earlier: leaving incorpo283. Three years later, the Court rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment pro
tected the right of butchers to carry on their trade free of legislative limitations on what
slaughter-houses they could use. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
Though the vote was five to four, only one opinion (Justice Bradley's dissent) clearly raises
incorporation as a theory of interpretation for the Fourteenth Amendment. Though
Slaughter-House Cases has generated an enormous literature, it seems beside the point to me
if limited to its narrow holding. Whatever the best approach to the right to carry on a trade,
it tells us nothing about whether the specific Bill of Rights guarantees were incorporated.
284. CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS , THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES
at vii, 38 (1912).
285. Id. at 31-33 (footnotes omitted).
286. Id. at 81.
287. Id. at 83 (eight of the twenty-one involved the Commerce Clause).
288. Id. at 84-108.
289. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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ration out of the picture, Section 1 would forbid a State from adopting
substantive laws that denied blacks equality with whites in fundamen
tal rights. The next issue, litigated in almost twenty cases from 1879
through 1909,290 was whether the Fourteenth Amendment also pro
hibited the application of a facially race-neutral jury selection law to
produce grand and petit juries that did not include blacks. This is the
second part of my interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause - that the executive branch could not "enforce" facially neu
tral laws in a way that violates privileges or immunities. These claims
are, of course, more difficult to prove and the Court treaded more
cautiously, insisting that the defendant had to show that the exclusion
under a race-neutral law was based on race alone. As no defendant
ever made that showing, no defendant won (though some won the
right to a remand in cases where the state courts refused even to per
mit evidence on the point).291
There were, to be sure, a smattering of Bill of Rights criminal pro
cedure claims urged on the Court during this period. The two most
famous were Hurtado v. California292 and Twining v. New Jersey 293 in
which defendants asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment granted
them, respectively, a right to a grand jury indictment and the right not
to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. The Court rejected
both claims. Defendants made a few other claims: that execution by
electrocution was cruel and unusual punishment, forbidden the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment;294 that a jury of eight violated the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial that the Fourteenth Amendment
imposed on the States;295 and that a coerced confession was forbidden
by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination that was now part
of the Fourteenth Amendment.296 The Court rejected all these claims,
usually noting something like the following:
,

The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically change the whole theory
of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other, and
of both governments to the people. The same person may be at the same
time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State. Protection to
life, liberty, and property rests, primarily, with the States, and the
amendment furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment

290. COLLINS, supra note 284, at 84-108.
291 . These cases are summarized, along with a few others involving racial discrimination, in COLLINS, supra note 284, at 48-62.
292. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
293. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
294. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
295. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
296. Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483 (1907).
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by the States upon those fundamental rights which belong to citizenship,
and which the state governments were created to secure.297

Consider the analytical structure of Maxwell v. Dow.298 The issue
was whether a jury of eight, as required in the Utah Constitution, vio
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that it did not.
It appears to us that the questions whether a trial in criminal cases not
capital shall be by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors . . .
do[es] not come within the clause of the [fourteenth] amendment under
consideration, so long as all persons within the jurisdiction of the State
are made liable to be proceeded against by the same kind of procedure
and to have the same kind of trial, and the equal protection of the laws is
secured to them.299

This neatly fits the equality reading of the Fourteenth Amendment:
the basic source of privileges and immunities under the Amendment is
state positive law; the real force of the Amendment is to make certain
that the state positive law is enforced in an even-handed manner.
The number of claims in the Supreme Court during this era that
the criminal procedure rights were part of the Fourteenth Amendment
is insignificant compared to the number of natural law claims. Six
hundred and four cases involved Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment, and the only criminal procedure right asserted repeatedly on
behalf of defendants was the exclusion of blacks from grand and petit
juries, a right that exists independently of incorporation because it is
at the heart of an equality-based Fourteenth Amendment. If barbers
in Minnesota were claiming a Fourteenth Amendment right to barber
on Sunday,300 why were state defendants not claiming violations of the
Bill of Rights criminal procedure guarantees?
Another oddity exists in the incorporationist story. The first claim
that one of the criminal procedure guarantees was incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment was not made until 1884 (Hurtado), six
teen years after ratification. During those sixteen years, twenty-five
other Fourteenth Amendment cases reached the Supreme Court,
dealing with issues from eminent domain and the fairness of state
taxation systems to whether women had a Fourteenth Amendment
right to vote and to practice law.301 Why so long before a lawyer raised
297. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 448.
298. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
299. Id. at 604.
300. COLLINS, supra note 284, at 31-33.
301. See Fox v. Cincinnati, 104 U.S. 783 (1881) (denying that Fifth Amendment just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a privilege or immunity); McMillen v. Anderson,
95 U.S. 37 (1877) (denying that state tax assessment system violated due process); Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (denying that female suffrage is a privilege or im
munity); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (denying that the practice of law
is a privilege or immunity that would entitle women to be admitted to practice).
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an incorporation claim in the Supreme Court on behalf of a criminal
client?
Perhaps the States were jealously guarding the rights of criminal
defendants. Perhaps. A more likely explanation is the lack of lawyers
for indigent defendants. But lawyers were busily raising the claims of
black defendants when blacks were excluded from juries. Why not
other claims for black defendants, if not for white ones?
It is no response to say that earlier cases had chilled the fervor.
Criminal defense lawyers are supposed to raise plausible claims, and
the early cases involving natural law claims did not hold that the
criminal procedure rights were not part of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Notice again the perseverance of lawyers arguing for inclusive
juries under race-neutral selection statutes. The first case was in 1880,
four years before the first claim that criminal procedure rights were
incorporated into the Amendment. Fifteen more claims for inclusive
juries were spread out over the next twenty-eight years; the last one
mentioned in the 1912 study was in 1908.302 Defendants never won yet
the cases kept coming. Why? The answer, I believe, is because the
country and its lawyers assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed equality of treatment, and lawyers kept raising the lack of
equality in jury selection even though the Court repeatedly rejected
their claims. The paucity of criminal procedure claims not involving
equality suggests that there was no similar understanding that the
Fourteenth Amendment fastened those rights onto the States.
So far I have argued that it is plausible to understand the Four
teenth Amendment to require States to provide a fair process for de
ciding criminal cases, laws that treat people equally, and the even
handed application of the substantive privileges and immunities cre
ated by state law. On this view, the point to the Fourteenth Amend
ment was to ensure that former slaves were given the same jury trial
right as other citizens, the same right to counsel, the same criminal
process in general. Viewed that way, it was a powerful tool to ensure
equal treatment but was never intended to be a tool to reshape the
state criminal processes. A State could have a law, as Pennsylvania did
in Twitchell, that the prosecutor need not specify the manner in which
the defendant killed the victim even if that law was inconsistent with
Sixth Amendment notice requirements, as long as the State provided
notice consistent with due process standards. The Fourteenth
Amendment had nothing to say about that. What no State could do is
have a statute that required additional specificity for white defendants
but not for black ones.
To see how the argument works as a whole, begin again with the
Bill of Rights. Established to restrain the central government, it had its
302.

COLLINS, supra note 284, at 65.
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own body of constitutional doctrine for more than a century. Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment can be read as a device specifically
framed to eliminate inequality and discrimination, a reading supported
by the history of the time and the debates in Congress and in the state
legislatures. Most of the debate about the Fourteenth Amendment is
about Section 2, Section 3, and the citizenship sentence in Section 1.
Bingham and Howard mention the Bill of Rights in connection with
the Fourteenth Amendment, but each seems to have a somewhat dif
ferent conception of the relationship between the Bill of Rights and
Section 1. The rest of Congress and the ratifying state legislatures nei
ther endorse nor oppose the perhaps inconsistent comments of
Bingham and Howard. After the amendment is ratified, the Supreme
Court first ignores, then rejects incorporation as an interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court continues to cite Barron v.
Baltimore when incorporation challenges are made to state power. Fi
nally, just under one hundred years later, after a great deal of fighting
over whether the First Amendment was incorporated, nearly every
criminal procedure guarantee in the Bill of Rights is incorporated with
little debate.303 The worlds have collided.
Before we can justify collapsing federal and state criminal proce
dure doctrine into one, however, we must conclude that the mention
by Howard and Bingham of the Bill of Rights, without any clear indi
cation that they had the same idea about what incorporation meant,
plus the almost magical background consensus that Curtis and Amar
claim to have found, is more salient, more probative on the incorpora
tion question, than the collective weight of all the other historical facts
noted in this Part. It is quite an interpretative feat. The remarkable
historical fact, in my judgment, is how serenely the academy has ac
cepted this argument.
If I am right, the Court's most grievous error in criminal procedure
matters in the last century was not the exclusionary rule or the expan
sive rules set down to limit the federal government in Boyd and
Gouled. Rather, the biggest mistake was to impose on the States the
procedures designed to make federal convictions difficult to obtain.
But can the Court go back? Is there an account of stare decisis that
permits the Court to disavow the reasoning in a dozen or so cases?
That is the subject of the next Part.

V. THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS
Recovering Robust Bill of Rights Protections

I suspect even readers sympathetic to my project will, by this stage,
worry about the effect of my proposal on precedent. Will my n.otion of
303. See supra note 1 5.
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a free-standing Fourteenth Amendment not require the slaughter of
many Warren Court precedents? If so, is that not in itself reason
enough to stay with the Court's doctrine of selective incorporation?
And if the reader accepts my historical critique of selective incorpora
tion - the States could not have realistically agreed to cede as much
sovereignty as later Courts would decide was justified - perhaps that
argues for total incorporation.
Oddly enough, total incorporation, but not my proposal, requires
overruling precedents. Total incorporation would require the Court to
overrule Hurtado, refusing to require the States to provide grand ju
ries; Walker v. Sauvinet,304 refusing to impose the Seventh Amendment
civil j ury requirement on the States; and Presser v. Illinois,305 refusing
to apply the Second Amendment to the States. By comparison, my
proposal to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment separately from the
Bill of Rights criminal procedure guarantees makes few waves. It
would require the Court to disavow its incorporationist dicta but, on a
standard account of stare decisis, no holdings would have to be over
ruled. The narrow holding in every case that incorporated a Bill of
Rights guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment is that the Four
teenth Amendment forbids, or requires, particular state action. The
incorporation mantra is an analytic device, not part of the holding.
In Gideon v. Wainwright,306 for example, the Court overruled Betts
v. Brady3°7 and held that Gideon's constitutional rights were violated
when his request for a court-appointed lawyer was not granted. Justice
Black, writing for a unanimous Court, spoke expansively about what
the Court was doing. "We think the Court in Betts was wrong . . . in
concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not
one of these fundamental rights [included in the Fourteenth Amend
ment]." The Court phrased the issue as whether "the Fourteenth
Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state court, just as
the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court." The Court said that
it does, thus "incorporating" the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
But the actual holding in Gideon is more narrow - that when an
indigent state defendant is accused of a felony in state court, and re
quests counsel, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause re
quires that counsel be appointed. Stare decisis would not stop the
Court from later deciding that Gideon is limited to felonies while the
Sixth Amendment also applies to misdemeanors. In effect, my argu
ment is that the Court can say it is incorporating the right to X into the
304. 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
305. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
306. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
307. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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Fourteenth Amendment, but the holding in the case does not bind fu
ture Courts who are interpreting X in federal cases. All that binds fu
ture Courts is the holding in the case, and the holding inevitably is
based on the Fourteenth Amendment because that is the text the
Court is interpreting. Until the Court overrules Barron, the only text
the Court can interpret in cases coming from state courts is the Four
teenth Amendment. The state "incorporation" case is thus not binding
precedent on a similar question from federal court that requires inter
pretation of the text of the Bill of Rights provision itself.
This traditional view of stare decisis means that the incorporation
cases did not overrule the prior robust federal precedents. Nor did
they necessarily overrule the narrow holdings of earlier cases refusing
to apply Bill of Rights guarantees to the States. For example, recall
Maxwell v. Dow,308 where the Court refused to incorporate the Sixth
Amendment into the Fourteenth and held that a jury of eight did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana309 repudi
ated the analytical structure of Maxwell and held that States had to
provide jury trials when prosecuting serious crimes. Two years after
Duncan, the Court held in Williams v. Florida310 that a jury of six does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though Duncan
changed the analytical structure, nothing changed about the size of a
j ury that the Fourteenth Amendment permits. Maxwell held that ju
ries of eight satisfy due process. Williams held that juries of six satisfy
due process. The narrow holdings, if not the analytical structures, of
Maxwell and Williams are consistent. In that sense, it is fair to say that
Maxwell has not been overruled.
Nor, for that matter, has the Court overruled Thompson v. Utah311
and Patton v. United States,312 holding that the Sixth Amendment re
quires a jury of twelve. To be sure, the Williams Court said it was
holding that the Sixth Amendment permits as few as six jurors, but the
narrow holding was that the Fourteenth Amendment permits juries of
six. Thus, as Justice Powell remarked in a later case, it is still open to
argue that the Sixth Amendment requires twelve jurors, and a unani
mous verdict, even though States are permitted to use juries of six and
to authorize verdicts on votes of 9-3.313 This is a nice, clean example of
my two-tiered approach to the criminal procedure guarantees. Under
Duncan and later cases, the States have imposed on them a due proc
ess version of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. Though the issue
308. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
309. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
310. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
311. 170 us 343 (1898).
312. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
313. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 367-77 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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has never arisen because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re
quire twelve j urors and a unanimous verdict,314 it might be that defen
dants in federal court are still constitutionally entitled to twelve jurors.
I do not wish to suggest that the Court could easily "overrule" the
analytic structure of its seminal incorporation cases in the criminal
procedure area. My two-tier approach, while faithful to history, would
essentially require the Court to rework a dozen or more cases. While
this would not be, in my view, a dagger to the heart of stare decisis, it
would ruffle the feathers of important precedents from the Warren
Court era. It would require the Court to say that it was wrong to con
clude in Gideon that the Sixth Amendment applies to the States, that
it was wrong in Malloy v. Hogan315 about the Self-Incrimination
Clause applying to the States, that it was wrong in Mapp v. Ohio316 to
say that the Fourth Amendment requires the States to apply the exclu
sionary rule.
Such mea culpas do not come easily to anyone, particularly courts,
and most particularly the Supreme Court. But I seek to ease the pain
by arguing that the holdings in these cases represent a reasonable un
derstanding of due process of law. Thus, the Court could say in a fu
ture Fourth Amendment case in federal court that, while it would con
tinue to adhere to a particular doctrine from a state case as an
interpretation of the Due Process Clause, it was going to apply a
broader protection in cases where the Fourth Amendment is the rele
vant text. That does not tear a hole in the fabric of American constitu
tional law.
To see why it might be a good idea to apply broader Fourth
Amendment protection in federal court, recall Gouled's holding that
police may not search for or seize lawfully possessed objects even with
a warrant based on probable cause. As noted in Part II, Gouled's
analytical structure was explicitly rejected in a Warren Court case
from state court. Compare Gouled to the scope of the Fourth
Amendment as it now applies to the States. If I set out my garbage for
the trash collector, I have no Fourth Amendment interest in it even if
it is still on my property.317 Unlike Gouled, whose property could not
be seized with a warrant based on probable cause, the police can go
through my garbage, on my property, without even the slightest suspi
cion. Or if I make a telephone call from inside my home, the police
can record the phone numbers called, without a warrant or any suspi-

314. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23, 31.
315. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
316. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
317. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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cion.31 8 Or if I open a skylight in my roof, police can hover overhead in
a helicopter and observe what I am doing in my home.319
The common law permitted constables to arrest individuals in
public without a warrant, but only if they had specific grounds to sus
pect that the arrestee had committed a crime.320 Today, I can be
stopped and frisked if I am in a high-crime neighborhood and appear
nervous and evasive.321 All of these cases came to the Court from state
courts. Not only are Gouled and Boyd dead, but their spirit is also
gone, sacrificed on the altar of incorporation.
Boyd noted, "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummag
ing of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal lib
erty, and private property."322 In contrast, the Court's language today
is more likely to note the valid societal interest in preventing crime.
Consider, for example, language in New York v. Burger, a case up
holding a statute that authorized warrantless and suspicion!ess
searches of junk yards.323
New York, like many states, faces a serious social problem in automobile
theft and has a substantial interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling
industry because of this problem . . . . In accordance with its interest in
regulating the automobile-junkyard industry, the State also has devised a
regulatory manner of dealing with this problem. Section 415-a, as a
whole, serves the regulatory goals of seeking to ensure that vehicle dis
mantlers are legitimate businesspersons and that stolen vehicles and ve
hicle parts passing through automobile junkyards can be identified.324

The nineteenth century Court stressed the importance of security,
liberty, and private property; the modem Court stresses the crime
problem. One Court assumed that security, liberty, and private prop
erty are sometimes immune from government infringement even by
subpoena or warrant; the other defers to statutes that advance "sub
stantial" interests. To be sure, the rising crime rate in the twentieth
century contributed to the shift in emphasis. But part of the change
had to do with the crimes under investigation: in Boyd, Congress was
seeking tools to help it uncover violations of the customs laws; in
Gouled, the federal agents were investigating mail fraud; in Burger,
the state legislation targeted auto theft. I suspect that Americans are
much more concerned about auto theft than customs violations or
318. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
319. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
320. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
321 . Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
322. 116 U.S. at 630.
323. 482 U.S. 691 , 713-1 4 (1 987).
324. Id.
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mail fraud. Thus, extending the Fourth Amendment to the States in
vites its reduction in scope to meet the "law and order" demands of
citizens.
There are only two possibilities when comparing the Gouled
Fourth Amendment with the current version, or when comparing the
discourse in Boyd with that in Burger: either the principles underlying
Gouled and Boyd have, somewhere along the line, been abandoned,
or the modern cases draw from a different constitutional source. The
Court takes the first approach. In this Article, I argue for the second.
Because Boyd and Gouled interpreted the Fourth Amendment and
Burger the Fourteenth, it is possible that all three cases were correctly
decided. My argument is that the robust protections of the Bill of
Rights guarantees are still there, cloaked by the Court's state cases
that say they are interpreting the Bill of Rights.325 When interpreta
tions of due process in state cases are forced back onto the Bill of
Rights criminal procedure guarantees, only mischief can result. The
Framers' criminal procedure is, like Sleeping Beauty, peacefully
awaiting the time that a Court discovers the historical error of the dis
torting mirror that is the Fourteenth Amendment.
VI. A NEW ROAD MAP TO INTERPRETIN G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE GUARANTEES

The High Wall Between Citizens and the Federal Government

The first five Parts suggest the following "road map" to the crimi
nal procedure guarantees. As to the federal government, the Bill of
Rights criminal procedure guarantees should be robustly interpreted
as a way to maintain a high barrier against federal manipulation of
criminal investigations and trials. This is simply true to the anti
government attitude and intent of the Framers. But in recognition of
the federal system that, even after the Fourteenth Amendment, still
vests considerable sovereignty in States, I would not require States to
meet those robust guarantees as a part of due process. Instead, I
would use as a due process baseline the criminal procedure doctrine
that the Court has created for state courts under its incorporation
rhetoric. The Court has, in effect, defined due process in its current
325. See e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (announcing that a dog sniff is
not a Fourth Amendment search) (dicta); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plu
rality) (Fourth Amendment not implicated when an agent hears words of narcotics dealer
from radio transmitter on government informant); Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293
(1966) (Fourth Amendment permits use of evidence provided by government informant who
was posing as a colleague of Jimmy Hoffa's). The current war on drugs and the intensified
effort to give law enforcement tools with which to attack organized crime both occurred af
ter the Fourth Amendment had been incorporated into the Fourteenth, and the distorting
mirror of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Court see the criminal procedure protec
tions in a more narrow light whether the issue arises in state or federal court.
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criminal procedure doctrine, albeit while claiming to be interpreting
the Bill of Rights guarantees. These cases basically ask whether the
procedures and mechanisms are fair and likely to produce an accurate
result.
To specify precisely how my theory might work in the context of
the Fourth Amendment would take an article unto itself, but I will
sketch a few thoughts here. Much of the "mess" that is Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence results from the Court's lack of a concep
tual model of the Amendment. We can argue about exactly what con
stitutes a jury, or when counsel must be appointed, or when someone
is being compelled to incriminate herself. But in each of these exam
ples, we have a core idea of what the right protects. Other than the
historical residue that searches of homes require a warrant, nothing
else is paradigmatic about the Fourth Amendment. The first clause
appears to forbid unreasonable searches and seizures, hardly a self
defining concept. For a couple of decades, the Court sought concep
tual clarity by reading the Warrant Clause together with the Reason
ableness Clause to create a sort of presumption that searches be con
ducted pursuant to a warrant. The Court referred to this presumption
as a warrant requirement, subject to a "few well-delineated excep
tions."
One difficulty with the warrant requirement was the rapid growth
of the "few" exceptions; "few" had turned into more than twenty at
last count.326 Moreover, the probable cause requirement that accom
panied the warrant requirement has also been seriously eroded. Police
today can detain and frisk on reasonable suspicion, can set up drunk
driving roadblocks and stop cars with no suspicion at all, and can ob
tain "consent" to search even if the person giving consent does not
know of her right to refuse. It is easy to see why the Court would not
want to fasten a meaningful warrant or probable cause requirement on
state and local police officers as they try to solve serious, violent
crimes. It is less clear that a serious warrant and probable cause re
quirement would be burdensome or out of place when federal law en
forcement officials are investigating crime - except for the war on
drugs, which is perhaps sui generis.327
The Fourth Amendment, on this understanding, would require
federal agents to obtain a search warrant whenever they have time to
326. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia,
judgment).

J.,

concurring in the

327. Even the effort to control organized crime would not, I think, be significantly af
fected by a meaningful warrant requirement because most of those investigations involve
careful planning and cover long periods of time. If the war on drugs is the only federal crimi
nal enterprise that is inconsistent with an historically indicated robust warrant requirement,
perhaps this suggests rethinking the role of the federal government in creating and policing
drug crimes. Only time will tell whether the war on terrorism will significantly erode Fourth
Amendment protections and, if so, whether the erosion is justified by lives saved.
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get one, except when searching incident to a valid arrest. This would in
great measure simplify and clarify Fourth Amendment law and would
distinguish the Fourth Amendment from the Due Process Clause, with
all of its twenty-odd exceptions to the warrant requirement. The
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement would permit searches of
vehicles stopped on the highway when it is not feasible to seize the car
and wait for a warrant to be issued, but not, as in the state case of
Chambers v. Maroney,328 when the police have already towed the car
back to the station before searching.
A revived warrant requirement would categorically reject the "in
ventory" vehicle search exception - a paradigmatic case in which of
ficers have time to obtain a warrant. It might also reinstate the United
States v. Chadwick329 doctrine requiring police to get a warrant to open
a closed container once it has been reduced to their possession. Inter
estingly, Chadwick is a federal case, and the decision essentially over
ruling Chadwick is a state case.330 Under my theory, both cases can co
exist. State officers need not obtain a warrant to search a container
found in a car even after they have taken it into their possession, be
cause the question is one of fairness of the investigative practice. If
they can seize the object and hold it to get a warrant, how is it unfair
to search it on the spot? But federal agents must get a warrant because
they must comply with a warrant requirement rooted in the Fourth
Amendment itself.
Why would a warrant requirement be central to the Fourth
Amendment but peripheral in interpreting the Due Process Clause?
Recall that the Framers were concerned with arbitrary use of execu
tive and legislative power. A search warrant requires the police to
show ex ante probable cause to believe that specific evidence is in a
particular place. If a magistrate agrees that the police have probable
cause, he issues the warrant. The warrant, on its face, shows to the
world that the use of power by the police is not arbitrary. And, as a
substantive matter, the invasion of our homes and offices is less arbi
trary if the police must show probable cause to a magistrate ex ante
rather than to a judge in a suppression hearing after the evidence is
found. But due process is about fairness in the investigation process,
not arbitrary use of power. Viewed as a question of fairness, the
twenty-odd exceptions to the warrant requirement might make good
sense, for in every case the police either have particularized suspicion
(probable cause or reasonable suspicion) or the suspect has done
something to undermine his right of privacy (e.g., left the evidence in
plain view or consented to the search).
328. 399 U.S. 42 ( 1970).
329. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
330. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565.
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Fourth Amendment law could be made more protective than the
due process version of Fourth Amendment law in other ways. If one
takes the Fourth Amendment seriously, federal agents would not be
able to obtain consent to search unless they warned the suspect of her
right to refuse. They could not, as the Court permits state officers, rely
on acquiescence as consent.331 In a federal case,332 the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment protected a telephone caller's expectation
that a pay phone not be bugged. But in a series of state cases, the
Court has found few other places outside the home protected by the
Fourth Amendment. For example, a passenger in a car has no Fourth
Amendment interest in the car's locked glove compartment;333 one
person has no Fourth Amendment interest in the purse of another;334
and a person who makes telephone calls from his home has no Fourth
Amendment interest in the numbers he dials.335 Because the Fourth
Amendment does not protect these areas, the Court does not require
that police act reasonably in searching or seizing.
These holdings might make perfect sense if the issue is due process
fairness. Is the state acting unfairly when it seizes evidence that some
one places in an area that she neither owns nor controls? Perhaps not.
The person has, after all, acted in a way that increases the risk of his
activities being disclosed to others. My narcotics are without doubt
less likely to be disclosed to others if I keep them in my pocket, where
I have control, than if I put them in your purse or your glove com
partment.
But understood as a "pure" Fourth Amendment issue, why should
the risk of disclosure be the key factor? The Fourth Amendment by its
terms protects "effects," as well as "persons,'' "houses,'' and "papers."
Perhaps all the Fourth Amendment should require is that I manifest
an expectation that my effects are shielded from the eyes of everyone
except the person to whom I entrust my effects. As long as I have re
stricted access in a way that would prevent the general public from
seeing my effects, why not grant Fourth Amendment protection? This
distinction can be seen in California v. Greenwood.336 If I put my gar
bage in an opaque plastic bag and set it on the curb on my property,

331. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (upholding, without a
majority opinion, a search based on consent when the federal agents told the suspect "that
she had the right to decline the search if she desired"), with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (refusing in a state case to require officers to warn the suspect that he has a
right to refuse consent).
332. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
333. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
334. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
335. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
336. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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Greenwood said that I have forsaken Fourth Amendment protection.
According to the Court:
It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed
their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third
party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through re
spondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.337

This casuistic reasoning might be appropriate when we ask
whether it was fair for the police to see what the trash collector, a
snoop, or a raccoon could have seen. But it seems out of place if one
asks the Fourth Amendment question of whether my right to be se
cure in my effects is violated. I perhaps assume the risk that the trash
collector will look through my garbage. But as long as my garbage,
contained in an opaque bag, is on my property, I do not expect federal
agents to rummage through it. Greenwood stretched pretty thin the
assumption of the risk argument, as shown by the contrary rulings of
some state courts when interpreting their own constitutions.338
In sum, a "pure" Fourth Amendment doctrine might protect what
I seek to protect. It might have a serious search warrant requirement
that requires a warrant for all searches, other than incident to arrest,
whenever the federal agents have time to obtain a warrant. It might
condemn detentions and frisks based on reasonable suspicion and con
sent obtained through implicit coercion.
Looking at the Sixth Amendment, the defendant's right to be con
fronted with the witnesses against him should, in a federal trial, in
clude the right always to be in the same room when the witness testi
fies. Due process does not include that right in a state trial, as the
Court held in Maryland v. Craig.339 Indeed, Craig is an excellent ex
ample of how applying the Bill of Rights differently to the state and
federal governments would provide a more coherent interpretational
outcome.
The Court phrased the issue in Craig as whether the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rendered unconstitutional the ap
plication of a state law that permitted the victim to testify in a differ
ent room from the defendant. The defendant's lawyer was in the room
with the victim, and the defendant could view the proceedings and
communicate with his lawyer via a closed-circuit television arrange
ment. Justice O'Connor wrote a tortured opinion for the Court that
was an easy target for Justice Scalia's sarcastic dissent. Noting that the

337. Id. at 40.
338. See, e.g., State v . Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996); State
(N.J. 1990); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990).
339. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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charge was child sexual abuse, the Court found that the State had a
valid and important interest in "avoiding, or at least minimizing, the
emotional trauma produced by testifying" and, more broadly, in
"safeguard[ing] the physical and psychological well-being of child vic
tims."340
The Court then read its prior Confrontation Clause cases to guar
antee the right to challenge in-court testimony as a way of discourag
ing witnesses from lying. The Court found that the Maryland system
contained protections designed to ensure that the defendant's lawyer
could test the witness's testimony for reliability. Balancing the interest
of the State in the psychological well-being of child abuse victims
against the (perhaps) slight diminution in the goal of advancing reli
able testimony, the Court said that the Maryland procedure did not,
on its face, violate the Confrontation Clause. It sent the case back for
a determination of whether the balance in the particular case tipped
for or against the defendant.
The Court in effect read the requirement of confrontation to be
coextensive with its rationale - to permit the defendant to challenge
the testimony of prosecution witnesses. Since Maryland had a proce
dure guaranteeing that defendants could challenge prosecution wit
nesses, it was likely to produce an accurate outcome. Thus, Craig
could have received due process even though he did not confront the
witness against him. And of course it was a state case, so the majority
was interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment with its requirement that
state processes seem likely to produce an accurate outcome.
But there was one problem. The Court based its ruling on the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, assuming that it applies against
the States precisely as it does against the federal government, and the
Sixth Amendment promises the defendant the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. The most natural reading of "to be
confronted" is for the defendant to be in the same room while the wit
ness is testifying.341 The Sixth Amendment does not talk about due
process, or fairness, or reliable outcomes. It talks about confrontation.
To substitute policy goals for the literal language of the Sixth
Amendment troubled Justice Scalia, writing also for Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens.
The Court today has applied "interest-balancing" where the text of the
Constitution simply does not permit it. We are not free to conduct a cost
benefit analysis of clear and explicit constitutional guarantees, and then

340. Id. at 854 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (Md. 1987)).
341. One could argue that the passive voice of the guarantee ("to be confronted with")
suggests only that the defendant see and hear the testimony. That was accomplished in Craig
by means of closed-circuit television. But it strains credulity to think that the Framers meant,
by use of a passive verb, to permit the defendant to be in a different room from the witness.
The weakness of this argument is confirmed by the majority's failure even to mention it.
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to adjust their meaning to comport with our findings. The Court has con
vincingly proved that the Maryland procedure serves a valid interest and
gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause guar
antees (everything, that is, except confrontation). I am persuaded, there
fore, that the Maryland procedure is virtually constitutional. Since it is
not, however, actually constitutional, I would affirm the judgment of the
Maryland Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of conviction.342

My road map recognizes both the common sense view of the ma
jority and the power of Justice Scalia's plain meaning argument. When
due process is the issue, why not rely on the procedural regularity of
Maryland's system and its likelihood of producing reliable outcomes?
But when reading the language of the Sixth Amendment, why not give
the words their natural meaning and require the federal government
to have all witnesses testify in the same room with the defendant? In
deed, a Court applying the Confrontation Clause only to federal trials
might be inclined to rethink its willingness to admit all hearsay evi
dence that qualifies under a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay
rule (an exception explained in a morass of conflicting cases and ra
tionales beyond the scope of this Article ).343 Perhaps the federal gov
ernment should have to produce all witnesses who are available and
not be able to rely on the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule
or any of the many other exceptions. This division makes sense as a
policy matter. Federal crimes should be matters of national, not local,
concern. The stakes should be higher. To require all available wit
nesses to testify in court does not seem particularly outrageous as an
interpretation of the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."
Another example of how the Court got the outcome right in a state
case but failed to understand that the right should be broader against
the federal government is the seminal speedy trial case that we saw in
the Introduction - Barker v. Wingo.344 This habeas case arose in
Kentucky and, under my proposed interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, should be tested by accuracy concerns rather than by the
specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. The
facts of Barker disclose a five and one-half year delay between arrest
and prosecution. Most of the delay was because of the prosecution's
strategy: the State felt it had a stronger case against the other partici
pant in a brutal murder of an elderly couple, and it wanted to convict
the other participant so it could force him to testify against Barker.
Apparently recognizing the difficulty in classifying as "speedy" a trial
that occurs five and one-half years after Barker was arrested, the
342. 497 U.S. at 870 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
343. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). As White is a state case, the equation
of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions and due process makes good sense.
344. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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unanimous Co.urt · spoke mostly in terms of whether the delay caused
doubt about the accuracy of the outcome, about whether the defen
dant's case was prejudiced by the delay.
But as Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent in a later case, why
should prejudice have anything to do with whether a trial is speedy?345
The issue of timeliness is independent of whether the defendant was
harmed. The likelihood of prejudice to the defendant's case, Justice
Thomas argued, is a due process inquiry. Precisely right, on my ac
count. When the speedy trial concept is applied to the States, it should
not be applied as a Sixth Amendment concept, for which the length of
the delay is the most important parameter. Instead, the speedy trial
right in state court would be simply whether the trial, despite the de
lay, was likely to produce an accurate outcome. For that question, of
course, the right avenue of inquiry is whether the defendant's case was
prejudiced by the delay.
Congress has filled the void left by Barker v. Wingo. In the best
tradition of American constitutionalism, where all branches of the
federal government, and all States, have an obligation to enforce the
federal Constitution, Congress rendered Barker largely irrelevant for
defendants in federal court. The federal Speedy Trial Act,346 passed
two years after Barker, is complicated and cannot be easily summa
rized. But the essence of the Act is that defendants have a right to a
trial within approximately six months of arrest or indictment. Thus,
five and one-half years would not qualify as speedy. This is a good ex
ample of a two-tier interpretation of criminal procedure rights - strict
guidelines (speedy trial within six months or so) should apply to the
federal government while the issue in state court is whether the defen
dant received a trial likely to produce an accurate outcome (the an
swer to which could be "yes" even though the delay was five and one
half years). Barker was correctly analyzed once we adjust for the state
court context and acknowledge its due process focus. Then we do not
face the embarrassing linguistic challenge of having to say that five
and one-half years is speedy.
If Barker had arisen in federal court under the Sixth Amendment,
the result should have been different. The Framers would not have
thought that a five and one-half year delay was speedy, nor should we
think so today. We have a "test" of that theory in the 1880 Montana
case holding that even six months can violate the speedy trial right.
Consider also the modern federal case of Doggett v. United States,347 in
which the trial was delayed for eight years while Doggett was blissfully

345. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
346. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-3174 (2000).
347. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
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unaware of the federal indictment.348 The Court held that the Sixth
Amendment was violated even though there was no ascertainable
harm to Doggett's case. To make Doggett appear consistent with
Barker, the Court invented a presumptive prejudice arising from a
delay of that length. I think the majority got it right in Doggett, but for
the wrong reasons. Doggett was denied his right to a speedy trial not
because there was a presumptive prejudice arising from the delay but
because the federal government, the executive and j udicial branches,
have an obligation to bring an indicted defendant to trial in fewer than
eight years. It is more satisfying to say that eight and one-half years is
simply not speedy, rather than having to invent a new presumption to
make Doggett fit the Barker state mold.
One of the problems with the right to counsel is figuring out when
the defendant has had effective counsel, an issue that has divided the
Court between the poles of whether the result was accurate or the
process fair. Strickland v. Washington349 tried to bridge the gap by de
fining a "fair" trial as one that produced a "just" or "accurate" out
come. From this premise, the Court developed a flaccid test that re
quires reviewing courts to decide whether the lawyer provided
assistance that was "reasonable considering all the circumstances"
and, if not, whether the unreasonable performance prejudiced the de
fense. To answer the latter question, the defendant must show "a rea
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."350 In effect,
Strickland requires a case-by-case inquiry into whether the lawyer's
failures deprived the defendant of a reasonable chance at an acquittal.
But, as Justice Marshall's dissent in Strickland makes plain, one
need not view "assistance of counsel" through the lens of whether the
outcome would have been different. One could view assistance of
counsel as a protection guaranteed in all cases, without regard to
whether the outcome would have been different. Justice Marshall, ad
hering to this view of the right to counsel, rejected Strickland's re
quirement of prejudice. This seems more in line with the language of
the Sixth Amendment, which, after all, guarantees the "Assistance of

348. These are the facts that the Court accepts, though the failure of Doggett's mother,
with whom he was living when indicted, to tell her son that federal marshals had come
looking for him with a warrant has always seemed a bit suspect to me. To be sure, he had by
that time left to go to Colombia; perhaps he and his mother had had a parting of the ways.
That Doggett had no notice of the indictment explains why the Speedy Trial Act did not pro
tect him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2000) (computing time period from arrest or service of
summons).
349. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
350. Id. at 694.
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Counsel for the defence" in all cases, not just in those cases in which a
competent lawyer could produce an acquittal.351
But in state cases, where the question is whether the trial produced
an outcome likely to be accurate (and Strickland was a state case),
much can be said for the Strickland majority's position. A trial can be
both fair and accurate with a lousy lawyer if a good lawyer would have
made no difference.352 Once again, my road map explains and j ustifies
tensions long thought to be inherent in the Bill of Rights criminal pro
cedure guarantees, but that turn out to be inherent in forcing these
guarantees into the Fourteenth Amendment and then having to live
with a distorted reflection of the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Look at what I have sketched: a Bill of Rights that actually pro
vides speedy trials, requires juries of twelve and unanimous verdicts,
guarantees effective assistance of counsel, requires the prosecution to
produce the witnesses against the defendant, gives the accused the un
limited right to subpoena witnesses who might prove his innocence,
and protects our right to be "secure in our persons, houses, papers,
and effects." Is this a fantasy? No, it is what the Framers intended, and
we can have it again if we separate the federal crime fighting machin
ery from that of the States. Why should the investigation of a robbery
or murder be burdened with the same privacy-protecting barriers as
an investigation into tax fraud or conspiracy? Or consider that
Congress has created about 100 statutes criminalizing false statements
in a wide variety of contexts.353 However courts feel about the culpa
bility of making false statements, they might be more willing to dismiss
an indictment, for failure to prosecute in a timely manner, under one
of those statutes354 than they would be willing to dismiss an indictment
for the brutal murder of two helpless victims. Similarly, courts might
want to read more expansively the right to discover the prosecution's
case, to confront witnesses, and to present defense witness who would
testify to the truthfulness of the statement or the defendant's lack of
mens rea. The right to a unanimous verdict from a jury of twelve
351 . I assume in the text that a lawyer who performs unreasonably, and thus fails the
first part of the Strickland test, is not providing assistance of counsel. While that is a contest
able assumption, it is more likely as an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment than the Due
Process Clause.
352. One way to divide the right to counsel doctrine between state and federal systems
is to permit federal defendants to prove a Sixth Amendment violation if either the represen
tation was unreasonable or the outcome potentially inaccurate, while state defendants could
show a Fourteenth Amendment violation only if they show a potentially inaccurate out
come.
353. See United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 959-61 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dis
senting).
354. The federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000), usually provides far
stricter time limits than the Court has discovered in the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial, but I deal in this Article with the constitutional question. Congress could, after all,
abolish the Speedy Trial Act.
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might be more appropriate in a false statement case. I do not claim
here, of course, that all federal crimes are on a low order of culpabil
ity, but with one notable and troubling exception, federal criminal law
is largely devoted to compliance matters - including tax law, perjury,
false claims, obstruction of justice, and bribery - as well as public
welfare offenses, computer crime, and various types of fraud.
The exception to this role for federal criminal law are the crimes
against consensual behavior, largely the many criminal offenses de
signed to deter drug use but also including gambling and prostitution.
These crimes require aggressive investigation and put federal agents in
a position similar to local and state law officers trying to solve murder
or rape cases. The federal crimes punishing consensual behavior are,
for me, a troubling exception to the more traditional federal role be
cause they raise policy arguments against my theory that we can "af
ford" more expansive criminal procedure protections in the federal
criminal process.
Perhaps in a concession to the modern role of federal criminal law,
it is no longer possible to recover fully the robust antigovernment in
terpretation of the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guarantees. But
as we saw when discussing Barker v. Wingo and Maryland v. Craig, it
still makes sense to decouple the specific criminal procedure guaran
tees from the fairness and accuracy concerns underlying due process
of law in the Fourteenth Amendment. The discourse, and even the
outcomes, should improve if we can speak more precisely about
speedy trials and the right to confront witnesses in federal cases while
limiting our concern in state cases to achieving a fair process likely to
produce a reliable outcome.
CONCLUSION
Where We Have Been, Where We Might Be Going

Prior to the Warren Court's incorporation of the criminal proce
dure guarantees, the federal criminal procedure world was very differ
ent from the world of each state's criminal procedure. When the
worlds collided, the damage was far more severe than anyone has yet
documented. As expected, the States lost some of their autonomy. An
unexpected, and still poorly understood, effect is the damage done to
the federal Bill of Rights. The barriers to federal investigation and
prosecution, once mighty protections, are now eroded, stunted, and
easily breached. The Court has "amended" them, one by one, through
the process of incorporation.
If one were designing from scratch a mechanism to oversee federal
and state criminal proceedings, one might come up with the model I
described in Part VI. One could plausibly expect federal authorities to
develop their cases against suspects without resort to the short cuts
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that the Court has approved in the state cases.355 Most federal investi
gations involve large-scale criminal activity or complicated financial
crimes and require sophisticated law enforcement strategies to ferret
out the evidence. On the other hand, the state criminal law largely
protects us from murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and larceny. Be
cause the welfare of the citizens is more directly harmed when these
crimes occur, and because solving these crimes is a very different en
terprise from examining bank records or looking for evidence of a
multistate conspiracy, one could conclude that state and local police
and prosecutors should be permitted to engage in methods that are
fair but not countenanced by the Bill of Rights.
The Court can recover the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guar
antees that the Framers intended and that the early courts applied.
The precedents still exist. They have not been overruled - just forgot
ten in the rush to apply the criminal procedure guarantees to the
States. The high wall between the federal government and its citizens
stands today. We cannot see it because the Fourteenth Amendment
mirror shines in our eyes, blinding us to the original purpose of the
Bill of Rights. That document was fundamentally antigovernment. It
was not designed to produce fair outcomes or reasonable accommoda
tions to permit more effective crime control. It was designed to hobble
federal prosecution of crime. Perhaps we do not wish to return to
thoroughly hobbled federal investigators and prosecutors. But to the
extent the critics of the last twenty years of criminal procedure doc
trine are correct, we need to return part of the way to that castle.
On my account of the passage and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, no barrier exists to keep the Court from retracing its
steps and recovering greater protections against federal investigators
and prosecutors. One can of course reach different conclusions from
the history I have presented in this Article. The modern consensus,
however, does not stand on a foundation as firm as its supporters as
sert. Indeed, in light of the scant historical support for incorporation,
the Court's initial approach seems better than that currently in fash
ion. When faced with the comments of Senator Howard favoring in
corporation, the Court in 1900 remarked: "It is clear that what is said
in Congress upon such an occasion may or may not express the views
of the majority of those who favor the adoption of the measure which
may be before that body . . . . "356 The Court decided in that case not to
incorporate a Bill of Rights provision, rejecting the theory of incorpo
ration as an extreme interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
today's world, incorporation does not seem extreme. But the historical
case for incorporation consists only of the remarks of Senator Howard
355. At least one could so expect if drug crimes are taken out of the federal mix.
356. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 , 601 (1900).
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and Representative Bingham - remarks that were met by the silence
of the rest of Congress, the silence of the ratifying legislatures, and
years of silence from judges and lawyers.
The .modem understanding of incorporation, it turns out, is built
on a consensus of silence.

